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SUMMARY 
The growing energy consumption in Belgium and Europe raises many concerns about 
security of supply, environment, climate change, volatility of prices and energy poverty. To 
bend this trend, the efficient use of energy in the household sector is of great importance 
bearing in mind the European objectives of reducing greenhouse gases emissions by 20% 
for 2020 and by 80 to 95 % for 2050. 
A decrease in energy consumption for the household sector can be achieved in two ways:   
- investing in energy efficiency for housing (e.g. double glazing) and domestic 
appliances (e.g. A++ fridge); 
- changing the behaviour of energy consumers 
Up to now, policy-makers seem to have focused on increasing energy efficiency of domestic 
appliances and housing. However, the final electricity consumption in the household sector 
(for EU-27) has increased by 8% between 1990 and 2007 and this despite 16% effective 
gains in energy efficiency for household appliances over the same period of time.  
Behavioural factors play an important part in this unsustainable trend of household energy 
consumption and it is thus necessary to develop policies that do not only tackle energy 
efficiency but also consumer behaviours. 
Smart meters and motivation for energy savings: filling the gap 
At the time the INESPO project was conceived, the discussions around smart meters were 
essentially technology-driven and there were important forces at play for a massive 
deployment in the EU. Front-runners in the deployment of smart meters (i.e. Italy, Sweden, to 
some extent The Netherlands) had mostly considerations relative to logistics, field 
operations, customer service, fraud protection, accurate billing or monitoring the distribution 
grid for instance. 
Focusing more on the human behaviours behind the smart meter technology is a first 
objective of the INESPO project. Besides, as recent studies show that the link between smart 
meters and energy savings for households is not undisputable it becomes more and more 
obvious that there is a gap on the issue of motivating households for energy savings in the 
researches carried out on smart meters. The INESPO project is seeking to design innovative 
instruments to fill this gap by adding incentives to the smart meter technology.  
In order to do so, the project is exploring the possibility of coupling non-financial incentives 
(complementary currencies) to smart meters. This is building on the emerging trend to use 
complementary currencies as policy instruments for sustainability (e.g. projects such as E-
portemonnee, Torekes or the former NU-Spaarpas project).  
The coupling with a form of market-based financial incentive inspired from the concept of 
white certificates with households as obliged actors is also explored.  
Designing new policy instruments 
The central objective of the INESPO project is the design (including the technical aspects) of 
system architectures that integrate complementary currencies or “white certificates for 
households” and smart meters.  
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The designed systems are intended to be used as instruments for energy policies and 
therefore developed and financed by public authorities. Beyond the core phase of designing 
INESPO, it is intended to provide first insights on the social acceptability, as well as the 
potential energy savings and economic aspects of the designed systems. It is however 
beyond the scope of this study to actually test the effects of the designed instruments in pilot 
experiments, or to deal with the many aspects (e.g. legal, political, privacy, etc.) that would 
go along with an implementation of the designed instruments by public authorities.   
Positioning INESPO 
Before embarking in the design of the systems, the first work package is dedicated to 
positioning INESPO regarding policies and measures, complementary currency projects, 
white certificate schemes and smart metering infrastructure in the EU. Insights from this 
research are fed in the system design phase. 
Determinants of energy savings 
With a similar objective, research is carried out on the determinants and barriers to energy 
savings for the household sector. The results of this research are used to see on which 
grounds complementary currencies and smart meters can promote the desired changes.  
Taxonomy and system designs 
As the research regarding the system design progressed, it became evident that a specific 
instrument was necessary in order to achieve successfully the core phase of designing the 
systems. A key step in this process was to develop a taxonomy of constitutive parameters of 
CC systems which allows reducing complexity and lays the foundation for the design of the 
INESPO systems and their subsequent evaluation. 
The work carried out on the taxonomy sheds light on the importance of the choice of the 
model in the design of the systems. Indeed, the research on the possible rationale for the 
model reveals a polarity between what we have called a rewarding and a regulatory 
architecture. This is used as a fundamental distinction between the two systems designed in 
the INESPO project. 
System designs (in a nutshell) 
System design 1 (S1) based on a rewarding architecture 
In S1, households participate to the system on a voluntary basis and are “rewarded” by 
public authorities for their energy savings. This occurs in two major ways: 
- Households can obtain complementary currency (CC) units through their relative 
consumption reduction over a given period of time (Δ in consumption) 
- Households can obtain CC units for some specific actions related to increasing a 
dwelling‟s energy performance, buying basic energy efficient appliances / products, 
energy audit, maintenance, as well as energy education.  
How households can use their CC units is a key parameter to bring participants on board in a 
rewarding system which has deserved particular attention in the system design. 
Among the key strengths of S1 is the potential to promote energy savings by the households 
who are consuming the most and have made little to no effort yet to reduce their 
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consumption. Besides, such a rewarding system is likely to be more attractive and socially 
acceptable than a regulatory system.  
Conversely, a key weakness of S1 is that it over-rewards households who are consuming the 
most and have made little to no effort yet to reduce their consumption. Besides, it is not self-
sustaining financially and is thus dependent on public funding. 
System design 2 (S2) based on a regulatory architecture 
In the architecture of S2, the system is based on a model with mandatory participation of 
every household. Such a regulatory system allows working on the total energy 
consumption and setting quota or targets for household energy consumption.  
S2 requires realistic targets which are calculated for households taking some elements of 
their profile into account. Each household obtains a number of CC units that corresponds to 
their energy targets.  
As a household consumes energy, it also uses CC units accordingly. At the end of the period 
for which the target was set, a given household energy consumption can  
- meet the energy target: all CC units have been used 
- be more than the energy target: the missing CC units are to be bought at a penalty 
rate fixed by public authorities 
- be less than their energy target: the remaining CC units can be sold to public 
authorities at a discounted rate. 
The price paid for energy itself remains unaffected in the INESPO S2 system and since the 
target is given in CC units, it does not physically limit the energy consumption as a quota 
would do. However, the fact that households earn or pay some extra Euros for CC units 
according to their consumption has a global effect on their energy budget. A variant with a 
market-based “white certificates for households” is also developed where households can 
trade their CC units. 
One of the key strengths of S2 is that every household has to participate. Targets can be set 
for energy consumption, in line with energy policies. Besides, S2 can be financially 
sustainable if targets and penalties are properly set. 
However, households whose consumption is high above their energy targets are likely to 
have major problems to comply. Since the mandatory participation, as well as the penalty 
bring S2 close to a tax-mechanism, it is likely that S2 is perceived in a negative way, and 
even rejected. The way the targets are calculated (and the parameters chosen for household 
profiles) is very sensitive, both for the equilibrium of the system itself and for its perceived 
fairness. 
Technical aspects  
The objective of this part of the research is to investigate the technical feasibility of the 
coupling of complementary currencies and smart meters, and to provide first insights on how 
this could be achieved. 
Regarding technical options for the smart meters, two options are considered:  
- a base scenario where neither the metering infrastructure nor the meter itself are 
designed specifically for the INESPO system. 
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- an advanced scenario where smart meters can be extended to incorporate INESPO 
specific functions.  
The research carried out on the use cases mainly comprises consumer as well as back-office 
use cases. First insights for the underlying database are derived from those use-cases. 
Besides, architecture outlines are also developed for the base and the advanced scenarios.  
Social acceptability of the designed systems 
Once the two systems are designed, it is of great importance to investigate their social 
acceptability. Focus groups were organised to investigate this question.  
The focus groups provide insights on the social acceptability of the designed systems (S1 
and S2). As could be expected, the rewarding system (S1) is preferred to the regulatory 
system (S2). Besides, participants in general are very favorable to the idea of using 
complementary currencies as non-financial incentives.  
However, the system S2 is not completely rejected and is seen as a potentially effective 
system to reduce households‟ energy consumption. It is considered that, if announced in 
time and backed by sufficient transitional measures, the core of the system could be 
generally valuable in the long run. 
Modeling S1 and S2 
A model is built for S1 and S2 with the aim of providing first qualitative insights regarding the 
potential energy and CO2 savings of the systems, as well as their economic evaluation. 
Estimates for total energy savings and costs of S1 and S2  
Figure 1 shows how, according to the model, the total energy savings and costs of S1 and 
S2 evolve in function of the rewarding rate (for S1) and the penalty rate (for S2). The 
modeling of S1 and S2 tends to show that S2 is a more efficient system both regarding 
energy / CO2 savings and economic aspects. This is mostly to be explained by the much 
higher participation rate that is expected in S2 compared to S1. Besides, S2 seems to be 
promoting behavioural changes which lead to lower costs for households to achieve energy 
savings. Finally, the penalty applied in S2 brings the system to an economic equilibrium. 
 
Figure 1: Costs and savings of S1 and S2 as a function of the rewarding and penalty rates 
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Conclusions 
The hybrid solution 
The S1 and S2 systems have been designed to explore the polarity between a rewarding vs. 
a regulatory architecture. It was thus purposely decided not to develop mechanisms to try to 
“fix” the problems inherent to the design of S1 and S2. 
It was rather decided to explore the possibility to design a “hybrid solution” (S3) to the 
problems raised by S1 and S2. In S3, some features of the rewarding model are integrated 
into the regulatory model to provide extra flexibility to the system.  
Further development and Policy implications 
The INESPO project has pioneered the way for using complementary currencies (with a 
market-based variant for “white certificates for households”) as an incentive scheme coupled 
to the smart meter infrastructure. It can be argued that the designed instruments present 
similarities with existing ones. Indeed, S1 is close in essence to a subsidy and S2 to a 
progressive tariff. However, the specificities of using complementary currencies make them 
different in many respects such as the rebound effect or the social network aspect for 
instance. 
Choosing between a rewarding and a regulatory architecture for policy making is a vast 
debate that touches on many issues. In the INESPO project, the aim is limited to exploring 
the possibility of designing systems based on both types of architecture, as well as providing 
first insights on their social acceptability and the modeling of some of their impacts.   
Besides, many aspects of the designed instruments deserve further research, and trials with 
households should be made to investigate their impact on behaviours. 
However, as exposed in the Position Paper, the possibility to effectively develop those 
instruments lead to practical recommendations regarding the roll-out of smart meters.  
Most importantly, it implies defining prior to deploying smart meters the necessary standards 
and requirements for  
- free accessible communication port for in-house use 
- consumption data manageable by consumer independently of the SM-DSO 
connection 
- optional feed-back systems (displays, websites, etc.) 
- optional transfer of data to chosen third-party (ESCos, energy services such as those 
that could be built around the INESPO concept, etc.) 
Indeed, if those choices are not made prior to the deployment of smart meters, it could 
hamper for decades the possibility to develop instruments designed to motivate households 
for energy savings.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The growing energy consumption in Belgium and Europe raises many concerns: security of 
supply, environment, climate change, volatility of prices, energy poverty, etc. To bend this 
trend, some directives have been adopted at the EU level, regarding energy production and 
consumption. 
Regarding energy production, directives have already been implemented / voted, among 
others to promote renewable energy (e.g. Renewable Energy Directive, 2009/28). But, 
although renewable energy production is likely to significantly increase in the next decades, 
energy consumption will have to go down considerably at the same time to match the 
objective of reducing the greenhouses gases emission by 80 to 95 % by 2050 (European 
Commission COM(2009) 039). 
Energy saving is therefore one of the most essential topics to address in the coming years. 
Indeed, energy conservation and efficiency policies have great potentials in terms of 
emission reduction (IPCC, 2007).  
All sectors are concerned, but with its 25% share of final energy consumption and its 
considerable energy savings potential (EEA, 2010), there is a growing emphasis on the 
household sector. The efficient use of energy in the household sector is thus of great 
importance to achieve the European objective of reducing greenhouse gases emissions by 
20% by the year 2020. Moreover, it can contribute to improve security of supply and fight 
energy poverty. 
A decrease in energy consumption for the household sector can be achieved in two ways:   
- investing in energy efficiency (EE) for housing (e.g. double glazing) and domestic 
appliances (e.g. an A++ fridge); 
- changing the behaviour of energy consumers 
Up to now, policy-makers seem to have focused on increasing energy efficiency of domestic 
appliances (with, for instance, Dir. 2005/32 on the eco-design of Energy using Products), and 
on improving the energy efficiency for housing (with, for instance, the recast of the Energy 
Performance of Building Directive).  
However, increased energy efficiency does not automatically lead to energy savings in the 
household sector. The so-called rebound effect implies that people may respond to the 
introduction of more energy efficient technologies with behaviours that partly offset the 
potential energy savings offered by those new technologies. Such behavioural responses 
like, for instance, increased use of an energy efficient appliance, together with an increased 
number of appliances may lead to a paradoxical increase in energy consumption, despite the 
achieved progresses in energy efficiency (this topic is developed, among others, in the 
research work of Steve Sorrell, Sussex Energy Group, SPRU, University of Sussex). This is 
confirmed, for example by the EEA indicators regarding final electricity consumption. Those 
indicators show an increase of 8% between 1990 and 2007 of the final electricity 
consumption in the household sector (for EU-27) and this despite 16% effective gains in 
energy efficiency for household appliances over the same period of time (EEA, 2010 and 
2011).  
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Many studies have shown that behavioural factors play an important part in energy 
consumption. More specifically, the role of habits, and the lock-in of consumers in existing 
(carbon-based) socio-technical systems, as well as the study of social practices provide 
insightful explanatory factors for the current unsustainable trend of household energy 
consumption (see, for instance, Shove and Walker 2010; Gram-Hansen, 2009; Anker-
Nilssen, 2003 or Røpke 2001). 
1.1. Smart meters and energy savings for the household sector 
At the time the INESPO project was conceived, the discussions around smart meters were 
essentially technology-driven and there were important forces at play for a massive 
deployment of smart meters in the EU. Indeed, the Energy Service Directive (2006/32/CE) 
stated that “(b)illing on the basis of actual consumption shall be performed frequently enough 
to enable customers to regulate their own energy consumption”.  
At that time, the expectations for energy savings that users could make due to smart meters 
were rather optimistic. In case of direct feedback to the users, those savings were even 
estimated around 5-15% (Darby, 2006).  
A few years later, it was requested by the 3rd Energy Package (Directive 2009/72/CE) that 
Member States make a cost-benefit analysis for the deployment of smart meters, with the 
obligation of a 80% roll-out in case of a positive result. 
1.2. Motivating for energy savings: the INESPO project 
Focusing more on the human behaviours behind the smart meter technology was a first 
objective of the INESPO project. Besides, as more recent studies show that the link between 
smart meters and energy savings for households is not undisputable (e.g. PWC, 2012; 
Klopfert and Wallenborn, 2011; Hargreaves et al., 2010) it became more and more obvious 
that there was a gap on the issue of motivating households for energy savings in the 
researches carried out on smart meters. The INESPO project is seeking to design innovative 
instruments to fill this gap by adding incentives to the smart meter technology.  
The new policy instruments designed in the INESPO project are exploring the possibility of 
coupling non-financial incentives (complementary currencies) to smart meters. This is 
building on the emerging trend to use complementary currencies as policy instruments for 
sustainability policies (e.g. projects such as E-portemonnee, Torekes or the former NU-
Spaarpas project).  
The coupling with a form of market-based financial incentive inspired from the concept of 
white certificates with households as obliged actors is also explored. However, as the 
research on constitutive elements of complementary currency and white certificate schemes 
progressed, two main conclusions were drawn: 
- constitutive elements of both types of instruments showed similarities  
- the obligatory aspect of white certificates schemes, as well as the possibility to sell 
and trade were seen as a distinctive feature of white certificate schemes 
Consequently, extending the concept of white certificates to the household sector as obliged 
party translates, in the framework of the INESPO project, into designing a system of 
complementary currencies based on an obligatory architecture with a marked-based system 
of exchange. 
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1.3. Designing the new instruments 
At the core of the INESPO project is the design (including the technical aspects) of system 
architectures that integrate complementary currencies or „white certificates for households‟ 
and smart meters. Those innovative instruments based on the use of smart metering aim at 
motivating households for energy savings both through behavioural changes and 
investments in energy efficiency. The designed systems are intended to be used as 
instruments for energy policies and therefore developed and financed by public authorities.  
The first attempts to design the systems and integrate them with smart meter technology 
revealed, however, that too many parameters had to be taken into account, some of them 
having a decisive impact on the architecture of the systems. It was thus necessary to reduce 
complexity by carrying further the analysis of the constitutive parameters of CC systems 
which was initiated in the task dedicated to positioning INESPO. This led to a taxonomy (new 
task compared to initial planning) of constitutive elements of those systems which lays the 
foundation for the design of the INESPO systems.  
This taxonomy is indeed central for the design phase and is also used in further work 
packages dedicated to providing first elements on the social acceptability as well as energy 
saving potential and economic aspects of the designed systems. 
1.4. Smart meters roll-out, a burning actuality context 
However, as the INESPO project is exploring the possibility to design new instruments to 
motivate households for energy savings, the smart meter roll-out is becoming a subject of 
burning actuality. Indeed, the deadline of 3 September 2012 when Member States have to 
deliver their cost-benefits analysis on smart meter roll-out is coming closer. Discussions 
regarding technological, legal and cost-bearing aspects of the roll-out (as well as how and 
when to do it) mobilize different stakeholders and points of views. But INESPO is focusing on 
another aspect which seems currently under researched: can a SM roll-out also be used to 
motivate households for energy savings?  
Besides, the compromise on a proposal for a Directive on Energy Efficiency that would 
repeal Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC reached by the European Parliament and the 
Council on June 14th 2012 shows that the issues of informing and empowering consumers 
regarding their energy use has come up the policy agenda. 
It was thus strongly felt during the follow-up committees of the project that INESPO brings 
new arguments and points of views that should be known to policy-makers. To take this into 
account, the new task of developing a Position Paper was added to the initial planning. This 
Position Paper was presented to important stakeholders of the smart meter roll-out in 
Belgium during an extended follow-up committee meeting.  
1.5. Structure of the report 
The report is structured in the following manner: 
After this introduction, section 2 is dedicated to presenting the methodology and results of 
the research carried out in the INESPO project. This covers Positioning INESPO (section 
2.1) by providing an overview of the relevant policies and measures, complementary 
currencies projects, white certificates schemes and smart metering infrastructure in the EU. 
Section 2.2 is dedicated to the methodology and results for Designing INESPO. This covers 
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linking the determinants of energy saving behaviours to the incentives used in the project, 
developing a taxonomy of constitutive parameters, and applying the preliminary steps for the 
design of the systems. The following section 2.3 describes the Designed Systems which 
include S1 based on a rewarding architecture, S2 based on a regulatory architecture and S3 
based on a hybrid architecture. The technical aspects of the designed systems are also 
covered in this section. Section 2.4 is then dedicated to the Social Acceptability of the 
designed systems (S1 and S2) and includes methodology and results. In section 2.5, first 
elements are provided for the Evaluation of the designed systems (S1 and S2) regarding 
potential energy and CO2 savings as well as economic aspects, which includes modelling S1 
and S2. Section 2.6 and 2.7 are dedicated to Policy Support : a Position Paper developed 
more specifically for policy-makers in the field of smart meters roll-out is presented in 
section 2.6 and Further policy recommendations and conclusions follow in section 2.7.  
Section 3 summarises the Dissemination and Valorisation activities and Section 4 the 
Publications of the Partners to the project. Acknowledgments are made in Section 5 and 
the list of References is provided in Section 6.  
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2. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
2.1. Positioning INESPO 
The question of motivating households for energy savings is at the heart of the INESPO 
project. With this objective in mind, the project explores the possibility to add incentives 
(complementary currencies / white certificates) to the smart meter technology. The core task 
of the INESPO project is thus to design new energy saving instruments based on the 
innovative coupling of smart meters and complementary currencies / white certificates. 
Those innovative policy instruments are intended to be used and financed by public 
authorities.  
Before embarking into the design of those policy instruments, it is however necessary to 
position INESPO within the actual context of policies and measures, as well as regarding the 
most promising aspects of complementary currencies, white certificates and smart meters 
that can be used for the design of the new systems.  
2.1.1. Overview of EU directives and Belgian policies and measures regarding 
energy savings 
Should everything else remain equal, increasing energy efficiency results in energy savings. 
In reality, however, energy savings resulting from efficiency improvements at the household 
level have to an important extent been offset by behavioural factors like an increased use of 
electric appliances, changes in comfort standards, etc. As pointed out by McLaren et al. 
(1998) the real question is thus not so much „how can we be that much more efficient‟, but 
„how can we ensure the gains from our efficiency strategies are used to deliver real 
environmental improvements‟. The latter question opens up the discussion to include 
sufficiency, which implies changing our behaviour in order to realise energy savings (Herring, 
2006) and, in turn, on the instruments that can promote the desired behavioural changes. 
Rulemaking and division of powers in the field of energy 
The objectives of the energy saving policies in Belgium are largely inspired by European 
commitments. European regulatory action addressing energy consumption by households 
sets the scene for the way in which domestic energy use is tackled in Belgium. Just like the 
European energy policy, energy policies in Belgium are particularly influenced by the need to 
mitigate climate change. This is because there is an important synergy between reducing the 
emissions of green house gasses and energy production and consumption as the latter 
accounts for about 80 % of the total greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-27 (EEA, 2008). 
Climate policy, however, affects many other policy fields. The federal government and the 
regions, which in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol are responsible for reducing the 
Belgian greenhouse gas emissions over the period 2008-2012 by 7,5% compared to 1990, 
seek to achieve this target in a way which is most appropriate given the specificities of the 
Belgian economy and development path. In this respect the federal government disposes of 
competences in the field of taxing (setting taxes on energy), product policy (implementing 
minimum standards for the energy performance of energy using products) and energy 
(nuclear energy, planning of major infrastructures for the production and storage of energy, 
energy tariffs and offshore energy policy). The regions, on the other hand, are responsible for 
rational energy use, renewable energy, transport and local distribution of gas and electricity, 
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environmental policy, mobility, housing, industry and agriculture. (Federal Climate Change 
Service, 2010; National Climate Commission, 2009) 
European regulatory action aimed at reducing energy consumption at the household level 
largely focuses on making buildings and (household) products more energy efficient. The 
former is facilitated by directives on the promotion of energy end-use efficiency (Directive 
2006/32/EC) and on the energy performance of buildings (Directives 2002/91/EC and 
2010/31/EU). The latter is shaped by a directive on energy labelling of domestic appliances 
(Directive 92/75/EEC and Directive 2010/30/EU) and a directive which establishes a 
framework for the setting of eco-design requirements for energy-using products (Directive 
2005/32/EC). The first three regulatory initiatives are part of the theme „rational energy use in 
Buildings‟, one of the 11 strategic axes of the Belgian climate plan 2009-2012. The last 
initiative on eco-design requirements of energy-using products is integrated in the Belgian 
law on product standards, but is not explicitly referred to in the National climate plan. 
(National Climate Commission, 2008) 
Whereas Member States actively promote the energy end-use efficiency and energy 
performance of buildings they, apart from the enforcement and inspection of the specific 
regulations, do not have to intervene much with respect to the energy labelling of domestic 
appliances nor with the eco-design requirements of products. Products that do not comply 
with the requirements are simply removed from the market. Eco-design may be stimulated by 
various programmes, but the link to energy savings at the household level is, at least, very 
indirect. 
Policies and measures stimulating rational energy use in buildings 
The Belgian policies and measures all relate to stimulating rational energy use in buildings, 
facilitating the implementation of Directives 2006/32/EC, 2002/91/EC, 2010/31/EU, 
92/75/EEC and 2010/30/EU. The following sources have been used to develop the overview 
of relevant Belgian policies and measures: 
- The National Climate Plan of Belgium 2009 -2012 (National Climate Commission, 
2008); 
- Belgium‟s fifth national communication on climate change under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (National Climate Commission, 2009); 
- the Flemish (Flemish administration, 2006), Walloon (Walloon administration, 2007a) 
and Brussels (Brussels Institute for Management of the Environment IBGE-BIM, 
2002) plan addressing climate change;  
- the contribution of the federal government (Federal administration, 2007), as well as 
the contributions of the Flemish (Flemish administration, 2007), Walloon (Walloon 
administration, 2007b) and Brussels (Brussels Institute for Management of the 
Environment IBGE-BIM, 2007) regions to the first Belgian energy efficiency action 
plan (2008-2010) within the framework of Directive 2006/32/EC; 
- the publication „Premies voor energiebesparing in Vlaanderen‟ (Vlaams Energie 
Agentschap, 2010); 
- information on the websites of the competent regional administrations 
http://www.energiesparen.be/ (Flemish region), http://energie.wallonie.be/ (Walloon 
region) and http://www.ibgebim.be/ (Brussels region). 
The instruments policy makers dispose of for influencing the behaviour of specific target 
groups typically can be divided into three groups: obligation (legal instruments like orders 
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and prohibitions, permissions, standards, etc.), exchange (economic stimuli like taxes, 
subsidies, tradable permits, etc.) and persuasion (social instruments like information, 
education, promotion of good practices, etc.) (Verbruggen, 1994). The initiatives that deal 
with stimulating rational energy use in buildings make use of obligation, exchange as well as 
well as persuasion: 
- minimum energy performance standards are imposed to new buildings and existing 
buildings that are subject to major renovations. Therefore, methodologies have been 
developed for calculating the integrated energy performance of buildings. The 
standards in the different regions vary in terms of their stringency as well as the way 
they are determined; 
- systems have been developed for the energy performance certification of new and 
existing buildings. An energy performance certificate informs owners, users and 
potential tenants and buyers of a building‟s energy performance and possible energy 
efficiency improvement measures. This certification system has been developed to 
make the housing market more transparent with respect to the energy performance of 
buildings; 
- financial stimuli, principally tax deductions and grants, are used for stimulating 
rational energy use in buildings. Other financial incentives are loans. These financial 
stimuli are provided by a variety of actors; 
- strategies for realizing the targeted energy savings by the promotion of rational 
energy use in buildings are made up of a great variety of communication initiatives. 
The objectives of these initiatives range from raising awareness, about the need to 
save energy and the relatively important benefits that some relatively minor 
investments or behavioral changes may bring, to providing tailor made advice; 
- schemes have been set up for creating, training and recognising energy specialists 
who can then perform energy audits. The objective of these schemes is to develop a 
market for energy services; 
- public centers offer disadvantaged people assistance and targeted technical advice 
as well as information on financial aid; 
- urban planning and building regulations that obstruct energy efficient building and 
renovation are relaxed; 
- obligation to conduct a regular maintenance and control of boilers fired by means of a 
non renewable fuel; 
- informative billing requirements of energy consumption in order to provide final 
customers with a comprehensive account of their energy consumption and related 
costs; 
- promotion of the uptake of energy efficient household appliances; 
- financial incentives for the promotion of plug-in electric vehicles. 
Conclusions 
Policies and measures concerning lowering energy consumption at the household level 
heavily rely on promoting energy efficiency. It can be concluded that people‟s energy 
behaviour is only marginally addressed by current policies and measures. Relevant initiatives 
in this respect are the exemplary role of the public sector, product labelling, information 
provision and informative billing of energy consumption. Although there are some initiatives 
that seek to change people‟s „everyday life‟ actions most only target people‟s energy 
behaviour through influencing their investment decisions. Besides the aforementioned 
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government led initiatives, there are a number of actions initiated by the environmental 
movement. An interesting type of initiative is an „energy challenge‟ like „energiejacht‟ 
(formerly known as „klimaatwijken‟).  
Today, there is not a structural system that promotes people to change their energy 
behaviour. The communication or persuasion initiatives are free of obligation. In our view 
there is room for a system that rewards energy saving behaviour and/or sets standards 
which require people to change their energy behaviour on a structural basis. 
2.1.2. Overview of complementary currencies for sustainability in the EU 
As argued in the preceding section, existing policies and measures are not sufficiently 
oriented at motivating households to change their behaviours towards energy savings. The 
types of behaviours at hand are complex: investment behaviours, as well as everyday life 
behaviours. Although public authorities actively promote investments in energy efficiency 
through direct subsidies, their actions (e.g. communication, information) to bend everyday life 
behaviours towards energy savings do not seem sufficient. Bearing those elements in mind, 
it felt necessary to investigate innovative ways to motivate households for energy savings. 
Complementary Currencies, also referred to as „alternative‟, „local‟, „social‟, „parallel‟ or 
„community‟ currencies in the literature (see, for instance, Glover, 1995; Solomon, 1996; 
Moers, 1998; Blanc, 1998; De Meulenaere, 1998) encompass a great diversity of systems in 
the EU. Indeed, ranging from grass-roots Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS) to 
more top-down, sustainability-oriented schemes, complementary currencies have the 
common trait of using another standardised unit than the Euro to mediate exchanges. 
According to the definition provided by Bernard Lietaer et al. (2010, p.99), “(t)hese different 
types of currencies are called „complementary‟ because they are designed to operate in 
parallel with, as complements to, conventional national moneys.” 
Complementary currencies in the EU 
A first striking element when exploring the history of complementary currencies (CC) in 
Europe is that there is a long tradition of diversity regarding currencies, with a variety of coins 
issued at the local level and attested forms of dual monetary systems prior to the 
establishment of the metallic standard in the eighteen century currencies (Cohen, 2004; 
Lietaer, 2000; Fantacci, 2006). The setting up of the Swiss Wirtschaftsring, or „Economic 
Circle‟ in 1934 can be seen as a revival of this phenomenon. Indeed, in the midst of the 
Great Depression, a handful of short of cash Swiss businessmen decided to create this CC 
system to escape from bankruptcy. More than 75 years later, the Wirtschaftsring (WIR) is the 
“world‟s largest and oldest exchange based solely on a private or „club‟ form of money, with 
more than 77,000 small firm and household members in 2003” (Stodder, 2009, p. 80).  
But it is really as from the late 1980‟s that CC systems with social or local economic aims 
started blossoming in Europe. Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS) are probably 
the best-known form of those grass-roots CC systems with social aims. The rationale that 
prevails in most of the LETS systems can best be encapsulated in the concept that “one hour 
equals one hour” which serves as a basis for mutual exchange of services between 
participants. By 1999, the number of LETS was estimated to be around three hundred in the 
United Kingdom, as well as in France, and about a hundred in Italy, in The Netherlands and 
in Germany (Williams, 2006).  
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Time Banks are quite close in essence to LETS, with the principle that one hour equals one 
„time credit‟. In turn, „time credits‟ are deposited in the Time bank, and withdrawn when 
necessary. Some Time Banking projects received support from public authorities, notably in 
Italy, where they were initiated in a perspective of equal opportunities and balancing between 
work and family times, mostly for women (Lenzi, 2006). 
Other landmarks in the landscape of CC projects are projects of regional / local currencies. It 
is in Germany that this type of CC has developed in the most impressive manner. They can 
be characterised as being private monetary systems that want to benefit the local economy 
by retaining purchasing power at the local level (Thiel, 2011). Sometimes, those local 
currencies lose value over time through a mechanism of negative interest rate known as 
„demurrage‟. This is thought to promote a more rapid circulation of the money which should, 
in turn, benefit the local economy. 
Selecting CC projects used for sustainability policies  
For the INESPO project, the research is focused on CC systems used for sustainability 
policies that include an environmental dimension. However, in comparison to CC systems 
with local socio-economic aims that have developed sometimes to a considerable extent in a 
number of EU Member-States (Seyfang and Longhurst, 2012), environmental sustainability is 
a new and emerging motivation to create CC systems. Indeed, in their identification of 
existing types of CC systems, Lietaer and Kennedy (2008) could only spot one project with 
environmental sustainability aims.  
NU-Spaarpas 
This project called NU-Spaarpas has been developed in the City of Rotterdam (NL) and ran 
from May 2002 to end 2003 (van Sambeek and Kampers, 2004). It mainly consists of a 
loyalty scheme that rewards purchasing „green‟ products with more points than buying 
regular products. Rewarding some environmental-friendly behaviours (mostly linked to 
recycling) is also foreseen in the project. Though the private sector was very active in this 
project, public authorities also played a key-roll and it can be considered that, to a certain 
extent, NU-Spaarpas was used by public authorities as an instrument for sustainability 
objectives (Joachain et al., 2009 and Joachain and Klopfert, 2012). 
Through the research carried out in the framework of the INESPO project it was possible to 
identify, besides NU-Spaarpas, two other pilot projects that use CC systems as policy 
instruments for sustainability and have an environmental dimension.  
E-portemonnee 
The pilot project E-portemonnee was initiated in 2005 in Overpelt, a municipality of the 
Province of Limburg (BE) and is a leading experiment to use CC as policy instrument for 
environmental sustainability. Participants obtain points by performing some sustainable 
actions from a list established by the local municipality such as switching to green electricity 
or following a composting course (Bond Beter Leefmilieu, 2005). They can then exchange 
their points against products or services proposed in a list of rewards (e.g. entrance tickets 
for the municipal swimming pool or energy saving lamp bulbs). Contrary to NU-Spaarpas, the 
role of the private sector is very limited in E-portemonnee: it is a project where the 
Intercommunale for waste management (Limburg.net) as well as the municipal authorities 
have the leading role (Joachain et al., 2009 and Joachain and Klopfert, 2012). This project is 
still running and has grown to include 6 other municipalities.  
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Torekes 
The environment around CC is rapidly evolving and it proved a successful approach to 
extend the timeframe devoted to the research on CC with sustainability objectives.  This 
allowed including in the research the Torekes project that was launched at the end of 2010 in 
a deprived area of Ghent (BE). The aim of the project is to reinforce social links but also to 
create a better living environment. In this view, actions like painting the front of one‟s house 
or participating to „clean-up days‟ are rewarded with „Torekes‟ (i.e. in this project, the CC unit 
is called „Torekes‟). But caring for the environment at a more global scale is also rewarded 
through actions like switching to green electricity or placing a “no junk mail” sign on the 
letterbox. In this project, CC is also used as policy instrument by public authorities (Joachain 
et al., 2009 and Joachain and Klopfert, 2012). However, one of the specificities of this project 
is the important role devoted to local non-profit organisations. Indeed, they are responsible 
for organising some of the activities of the project (for obtaining as well as using Torekes). A 
very interesting example of this is the “community gardens” action. Participants to the project 
can rent a plot of land in community gardens. But this plot of land can only be paid using 
Torekes. The first results show this is a powerful motivation for residents of the area to get on 
board the project (Torekes, Verslag, 2011 and Bienstman, 2011). Besides, participants can 
also spend their Torekes in local shops (groceries, bakeries, etc.), which also contributes to 
make the project attractive.  
Biwa Kippu and Tradable Energy Quotas 
Besides those three projects, two proposals were also selected for further analysis: Biwa 
Kippu (Lietaer and Takada, 2010) and Tradable Energy Quotas “TEQs” (Fleming and 
Chamberlin, 2011). Indeed, in the Biwa Kippu proposal (Shiga Prefecture, Japan) 
participation to the system is conceived not on a voluntary basis but as a sort of civil service 
in CC (Joachain and Klopfert, 2012). This introduces very innovative elements regarding the 
model of the CC system that could not be overlooked in the INESPO project (even if it is a 
Japanese proposal). The same holds true for TEQs proposal (United Kingdom) which also 
works with mandatory participation. However, in this proposal, it is the idea of a „carbon 
budget‟ and allotted quotas that is explored. Therefore, even if TEQs is not per se a CC 
proposal, it was taken into consideration for the relevance of the system itself.  
Insights for the system design of INESPO 
The analysis of the selected projects was carried out on the basis of available data (including 
grey literature and websites). The data gathered on those systems mainly touch upon 
descriptions of how the systems function, as well as statistics about the number of 
participants and the CC units in circulation (Joachain et al., 2009). They are often presented 
in activity reports of the projects and are not collected for research purposes. Besides those 
available data, interviews of key actors were also carried out. This resulted in the 
identification of three main categories of constitutive elements for those systems: 
- History and objectives 
- Functioning and currency 
- Interface with users / merchants and database 
- Leadership, human resources, costs and financing 
This research also provided first quantitative and qualitative results on the selected projects. 
Figure 2 shows a summary of those results for two of the selected systems: NU-Spaarpas 
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and E-portemonnee (for more details, see Joachain, 2012, INESPO Internal Report on CC 
Schemes for sustainability in the EU).  
Benchmarking so few and diverse systems had little added-value to offer for the core phase 
of designing the new systems of the INESPO projects. Besides, a systematic understanding 
of the constitutive parameters of those systems was lacking. This lack was even felt more 
accurately when the research on the methodology to design the new systems of the INESPO 
project started. It was thus crucial to develop a new analysis instrument that could not only 
be used to analyse existing systems but, most importantly, to design new ones. This 
instrument – a taxonomy of constitutive parameters for those systems – is exposed in section 
2.2. Designing INESPO, page 37. 
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NU-Spaarpas E-portemonnee  
Objectives  Influencing the circulation of goods by promoting “greener" 
consumption and behaviours. Targeting the "grey mass" of 
consumers  
Using CC as a policy instrument to promote sustainable behaviours. 
Anchored at the municipality level 
Functioning  Participants receive NU points when purchasing in participating 
stores (4X more for "greener" products, than for "regular" 
products) and for specific sustainable behaviours (like 
recycling). 
The NU points can be used to obtain "green" presents amongst 
participating shops, daily passes for public transportation, 
tickets for events, etc 
System based on two lists:  
1) a list of actions set up by each municipality to obtain points. Typical 
items: switching to/using green electricity, following composting 
course/composting, etc.  
2) a list of rewards set up by each municipality to use points. Typical 
items: tickets for municipal swimming pool/sport centers/ movies, public 
transportation, etc. 
Type of currency Electronic - points - stored on chip card Electronic - points -  remote 
Interface Users: Web access to accounts / Merchants: Terminal - 
scanner - barcode (card) - chip (card) / Database: central DB 
Users: Human interfaces (Municipal clerck, etc.) - web access to accounts 
/ Merchants: I.D. card reader + web access / Database: central DB 
Leadership/partners Public / private partnership between the City of Rotterdam, 
Rabobank en Stichting Points 
Limburg.net (leading the project) + Bond Beter Leefmilieu (support) + 
municipalities (design their own version of E-port.) 
Human resources At peak time: 20 persons (17 FTP) employed mostly for 
promotion 
Staff from Limburg.net + 4/5 ETP Bond Beter Leefmilieu + municipal 
clerks (environment dpt, etc.) 
Costs/Financing Setting up costs and operational costs (HR costs + Technical 
costs: 10,000 cards - 100 terminals) with total budget > 3 
million euros. Financing: subsidies EU and Dutch authorities 
Limburg.net (project + software costs) + Subsidy from Flemish Region. 
Total budget < 100,000 EUR. Municipalities finance their E-port system: 
average budget 3,000 -5,000 EUR + sponsoring 
Results quantitative Participating households: 10,000 (peak time) - Points obtained: 
>1,500,000 (Most pop: recycling) - Points used: <150,000 
(Most pop : cultural events) 
For the pilot phase : Participating households: 15-20% - Points obtained: 
>350,000 (Most pop: recycling - composting) - Points used: < 130,000 
(Most popular: lottery tickets) 
Figure 2: Summary of NU-Spaarpas and E-portemonnee
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2.1.3. Overview of white certificates schemes in the EU 
White Certificate schemes aim at achieving energy savings in end-use sectors, such as the 
residential or commercial sectors. In order to achieve this energy saving objective, public 
authorities, often through energy market regulators, give to “obliged actors” (i.e. generally 
energy suppliers or distributors) mandatory saving targets. In turn, the obliged actors have to 
propose energy saving measures applicable to the “beneficiary sectors“(i.e. the eligible end-
use sectors). Obliged actors carry out the measures directly or through partnerships. Once 
the savings are measured and verified, according to a predefined measurement and verifying 
protocol, the regulator issues the corresponding quantity of certificates. At the end of the 
compliance period, each obliged actor must give to the regulator the necessary number of 
certificates to comply with its target. If not, a penalty system is often foreseen. In some 
schemes, it is foreseen that “eligible actors” might also carry out energy saving projects and 
receive certificates which they can later trade to obliged actors. The general functioning of a 
WC scheme is summarised in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: General functioning of white certificates with full options (trading and certification) 
Systems developed in the EU 
In Europe, 5 countries1 have introduced a system of obligations on some categories of 
energy market operators to stimulate investment and to deliver energy savings. When these 
obligations are coupled with the possibility of selling and buying certificates of saved energy, 
they are generally called White Certificates Schemes such as in Italy or France. In Italy, the 
“Tivoli di Efficienza Energetica” (tee) entered into force in 2005, putting an obligation on the 
distributors2. The scheme largely promotes „hard‟ measures. It allows eligible actors3, 
including esco‟s4, to trade certificates with obliged actors. The Italian scheme promotes 
                                                 
 
1 Ireland has also a scheme, but no or very few information is available. 
2 In most of the schemes, the energy suppliers are obliged.  
3 those are other actors than obliged ones, allowed to get WC for achieved savings 
4 ESCO: Energy Service Company 
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bilateral as well as market trading. The crediting lifetime, that is to say the period during 
which a measure is considered as delivering savings (and thus certificates), is limited to 5 or 
8 years.  
As the certification of the savings and the possibility to trade are not systematically foreseen 
in all interesting similar schemes in the EU, the scope of the research was extended to 
include scheme developed in the UK for instance. The UK “Carbon Emission Reduction 
Trading » (CERT) scheme is indeed particularly interesting for the INESPO project, as the 
suppliers can only achieve savings for the residential sector. Moreover, the CERT includes 
behavioural and demonstration actions and its target must be partly achieved in priority 
groups. The UK scheme does not issue certificates for the savings but the absence of 
certificates does not preclude the trading under other forms such as the trading of savings 
and of obligations.  
Besides the Italian, French and UK schemes, the Flemish and Danish schemes where also 
selected even if no trading possibilities exist in those schemes. 
Analysis 
All 5 systems were analysed on the basis of system descriptions and data available in the 
literature (amongst which: Pavan M. 2008; Bertoldi et al. 2010; Lees 2007; Togeby M et al. 
2007; Baudry & Osso 2011; EuroWhiteCert team 2006; for more details, see Holzemer, 
2010, INESPO Internal report on White Certificates Schemes in the EU).  
This shed light on main constitutive parameters of such systems (see Figure 3): 
- Targets 
- Obliged parties 
- Scope of the scheme 
- Certification and Trading 
- Governance issues (e.g. baseline and additionnality rules, measurement and 
verification methods)  
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  Italy (TEE) France (CEE) UK (EEC, CERT) Flanders Denmark 
Since… 2005 2006 2002 2003 2006 
OBLIGATIONS 
Target  
Annual Target & compliance 
Annual  
Primary energy (Toe) 
 
2010: 4,3 MToe 
 
 
Pluriannual target & 
compliance 
Final en. (TWh cumac) 
 
 
2006-09: 54 TWh cumac 
2010-: at least 100 TWh* 
Pluriannual target & 
compliance 
EES: final en. (TWh) 
CERT: carbon content 
(MTCO2) 
EEC1: 62 TWh 
EEC2: 130 TWh 
CERT:185 MtCO2 
(+/- Half of the target = in 
the priority group) 
Annual target & 
compliance 
Primary energy 
 
 
0.58 TWh/y 
(A part of the target in a 
low income households 
group + complementary 
obligations) 
Annual target & compliance 
Final energy 
 
 
 
2006:2,95 Pj/y 
2008:5,4Pj/y 
Obliged actors 
 
 
 
 
Threshold: 
Electricity and gas distributors  
 
 
 
More than 10000 customers, 
since 2009 more than 50000 
in y-2. 
Energy suppliers (electricity, 
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cooling for stationary applic. 
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End-use sectors 
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All fuel savings 
 
 
 
Energy service providers, 
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controlled cies. Since 2007 
other cies (if they reduce 
their own energy and have an 
energy manager) 
 
All (including transport) 
Electricity, natural gas, GPL, 
heat and cooling, domestic 
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Figure 4: Comparison of white certificate schemes 
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All EU existing scheme function on a mandatory basis, that is to say they have fixed 
mandatory targets to some energy market actors. However, the schemes are usually also 
flexible in the sense that they offer different possibilities for obliged actors to comply. This 
allows for obliged actors to choose the most cost-effective options. Indeed, it is only the 
achieved savings which are taken into account and not the amount of money invested by the 
obliged actors. 
The INESPO project is seeking ways to extend the concept of white certificates to 
households as obliged actors for the residential sector.  
However, as the research on constitutive elements of complementary currency and white 
certificate schemes progressed, two main conclusions were drawn: 
- constitutive elements of both types of instruments showed similarities  
- the obligatory aspect of white certificates schemes, as well as the possibility to sell 
and trade were seen as a distinctive feature of white certificate schemes 
Consequently, extending the concept of white certificates to the household sector translates, 
in the framework of the INESPO project, into designing a system of complementary 
currencies based on an obligatory architecture with a marked-based system of exchange. 
2.1.4. Overview of smart metering infrastructure in the EU 
Before explaining the infrastructure envisioned in INESPO, a short overview of SM in Italy, 
Sweden is presented, as these two countries currently have the most widely deployed SM 
infrastructure in Europe. The cases of The Netherlands and Belgium are then exposed. 
Italy 
The smart metering system in Italy (called “Telegestore”) was developed in the 90‟s by the 
largest distribution company, ENEL. Technologically it can be considered as a second-
generation smart meter deployment (with simple PLC “one-way systems” being first 
generation). ENEL‟s metering system is currently exploited commercially by IBM. 
When liberalization of the energy market started in 1999 the Italian Regulator AEEG issued a 
resolution made the use of an Automatic Metering Infrastructure mandatory. The new meters 
were to be installed and owned by the distributors and furthermore customers are not 
allowed to buy their own meter. 
ENEL started a full rollout around 2000 which concluded in 2005 after the installation of 
about 30 million meters (Deconinck et al., 2010; De Craemer et al., 2010). Important reasons 
for the switch were the expected savings or revenues regarding logistics, field operations, 
customer service and, to a high degree, fraud detection. The regulator, government or other 
market parties had no or only marginal influence on requirements ENEL had to fulfill. During 
the peak of deployment, more than 40.000 meters were installed a day by about 4.000 
workers. 
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Figure 5: ENEL smart meters (single phase & triple phase) 
It has to be mentioned that ENELs system is a very basic form smart metering, in that sense 
that it is mostly intended for remote meter reading, tariff switching and (dis)connection. 
However, the impact of ENELs deployment (and subsequent marketing campaign) on smart 
metering developments in other countries should not be underestimated, particularly among 
politicians and regulators in Europe. 
Sweden 
In contrast to Italy, smart metering in Sweden took off due to legislative decisions. Following 
a debate on inaccurate billing, the Swedish parliament passed a regulation in 2003 requiring 
all electricity meters (more than 5 million customers) to be read on a monthly basis by 1 July 
2009. If a meter reading is missing, extrapolation is not allowed (forward estimation) but 
intrapolation must be used (which means a later meter reading must exist). Only then, a 
meter reading will get the status ”calculated” and can be used for invoicing and settlement. 
The purpose of the new regulations was to give customers a better understanding of their 
invoice based on real instead of, up to then typical, estimated meter values. 
The Netherlands 
In the beginning of 2006 an effort was started by the Dutch Standardization Institute NEN to 
define a draft standard for smart meters in the Netherlands. This work resulted in a report 
called NTA 8130 released on 30 April 2007, defining a minimal set of functions and legal 
conditions a smart meter has to conform to. For example, the meter has to be remotely 
readable, offer remote (dis)connection for electricity and gas and facilitate the 
implementation of current-limits and load shedding. Meters would also have to be usable for 
monitoring the distribution grid.  
After finishing the project, a lot of discussion arose on the outcome of the standard. Some 
parties complained about the lack of functionality to facilitate a transition to a smart grid.  
Originally, the Dutch government proposed that all seven million households of the country 
should have a smart meter by 2013, as part of a national energy reduction plan. In August 
2008 the roll out of these seven million meters was delayed for several reasons, mainly 
because there was limited possibility to track small scale local energy production (e.g. by PV 
panels), and that there was uncertainty in the parliament on future developments in smart 
meters. More importantly, some consumer organisations tried to boycott the proposals to 
make smart meters mandatory (proposals 31320 and 31374) with petitions, out of fear that 
not enough measures were in place to guarantee the privacy. 
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Eventually, the ministry of Economic Affairs decided that every customer should be able to 
have a smart meter installed, but only voluntarily. However, this was already possible before. 
Additionally, the maximum read-out frequency is limited to bi-monthly.  
Smart metering in Belgium 
Flanders 
In Flanders, the biggest players on the distribution market are Eandis and Infrax. Both are 
cooperating to implement a smart metering solution in Flanders, with Eandis taking the lead. 
During the period 2009-2010, a proof-of-concept (PoC) was realized using Infrax‟s cable 
network (Infrax, 2009). The goal was to test communication (reading measurements, 
determining energy efficiency, link to gas meter) using a limited number of meters. Because 
this was purely a PoC, the cost of the hardware plus installation cost for single home was 
about €1000. 
A second proof of concept by Eandis studied the possibility of using PLC (Power Line 
Communication) to communicate with the MUC (Multi Utility Controller, to be able to read not 
only electricity meter but also gas and/or water meters). The increased reliability and 
bandwidth of Eandis‟ implementation could enable near real-time communication between 
meters, which is essential to realize the potential of smart grids. Typically, meters will be read 
out on an hourly or quarterly time base. A larger-scale test is currently going on, involving up 
to 61000 new smart meters. 
 
Figure 6: Eandis’ PLC based smart meter communication concept 
The VREG (Vlaamse Regulator voor de Electriciteits- en Gasmarkt) has also expressed its 
interest to prepare a so-called central Clearing House (CH) before a full smart meter rollout 
has begun (post-2012) (VREG, 2009a and 2010). This Clearing House could be considered 
as a “crossroad database” that regulates the information data flow between all energy market 
parties (related to billing, changing supplier, moving, etc…) (VREG, 2009b). 
Wallonia 
At the end of 2008 the Walloon regulator, CWaPE, published an outline for the introduction of 
smart meters (CWAPE, 2008). In the first phase, the functionality required for a smart meter 
infrastructure will be defined. The second and third phases should deal with the preparation 
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and realization of a pilot project and in the fourth phase a decision will be made about a 
large-scale rollout in Wallonia. However, no timeline was provided. 
Brussels 
In April 2009, the regulatory commission for the electricity market in Brussels (BRUGEL) 
presented its stance on the introduction of smart metering the region of Brussels (Quicheron, 
2009). A few scenarios were considered but the general idea conveyed is that the need for 
smart metering is not high enough to offset the costs for the involved parties. BRUGEL 
further notes that a coherent approach on the national level is necessary and that additional 
studies should be performed to determine the required functions of the meters. 
 
2.2. Designing INESPO 
Designing innovative policy instruments based on the integration of complementary 
currencies / white certificates and smart meters is the core task of the INESPO project. The 
research carried out to position INESPO provides an initial set of useful insights to ground 
the design of the systems. Complementary insights are found through gaining knowledge on 
some key determinants of energy saving behaviours. All this research material is intended to 
feed the reflection for the crucial phase of designing the systems.  
However, the first attempts to design the systems and integrate them with smart meter 
technology revealed that too many parameters had to be taken into account, some of them 
having a decisive impact on the architecture of the systems. Since benchmarking was not 
optimal to carry on with the design phase, it was thus necessary to reduce complexity by 
deepening the analysis of the constitutive parameters of complementary currency systems. 
This led to a taxonomy of constitutive elements of those systems which lays the foundation 
for the design of the INESPO systems.  
The methodology for designing the systems is thus based on the taxonomy and includes the 
following steps before embarking in the core design phase: 
1. Selection of the architectural models  
2. Selection of the technical options  
3. Baseline and profile computation 
4. Defining the system boundaries, actors and functions 
In the next section, insights about key determinants of energy saving behaviours are first 
presented. The taxonomy is then exposed and followed by the 4 preliminary steps of the 
system designs.  
2.2.1. Determinants of energy saving behaviours 
Although energy saving is primarily considered as an environmental issue, personal 
motivation factors to save energy can be manifold. Next to the desire to improve the 
environment or mitigate climate change, people could also change their behaviour for other 
reasons, like saving money, the desire to decrease dependence to (sometimes politically 
unstable) energy producing countries or regions, or others. All motivations are relevant. 
A non-exhaustive overview of the literature is presented. A broad focus is first adopted, as 
the motivations, incentives and determinants of a shift towards more sustainable behaviour 
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might be partly the same for specific energy behaviour. The focus of the analysis then 
gradually shifts to energy use by households, and mainly to the behaviours determining their 
energy use. 
Theories explaining behaviour and behavioural change 
Energy use and the social dilemma: the rationalistic approach 
Policy makers and scientists, mainly neo-classical economists, consider the individual 
consumer as a rational human being, who makes his consumption choices based on a kind 
of personal cost benefit analysis (de Bakker et al., 2008). The model of „reasoned action‟ by 
Ajzen (1991) fits into this school. He states that intentional environmentally friendly behaviour 
is a function of a motivational and a normative component. The first refers to the 
consequences the consumer expects from his behaviour and his evaluation of these 
consequences. The latter refers to the (perceived) social norms and the consumer‟s 
willingness to comply with these norms (Beckers et al., 1999).  
In this perspective, government campaigns to make citizen behaviour more sustainable often 
rely on information campaigns, aiming to convince the consumer that he or she should care 
about the environment and think about the future generations. In practice, however, these 
sensitising campaigns often have little effect. This is sometimes explained by the consumer‟s 
social dilemma: on the one hand, the citizen is aware of the problems of the environment, 
and he is in favour of tackling these problems, but on the other hand he thinks that he has no 
personal benefit from it, and others will take advantage from it and just continue their old 
behaviour (Milieu en Natuur Planbureau, 2007). The result of this dilemma is inconsistent 
behaviour (Beckers et al., 1999). 
Critique on the rationalistic approach 
According to Ester (1999), the rationalistic perspective on environmentally relevant behaviour 
has three weak points: 
- it ignores that (environmental) behaviour is a complex matter and more than the sum 
of the individual behaviours; 
- it does not provide a satisfactory explanation on how consumers make appraisals and 
how they are influenced by social and cultural trends; 
- it does not include the supply side of the alternatives for the consumer‟s behaviour: 
even if a consumer has a positive attitude and an intention for environmentally 
friendly behaviour, there might still be obstacles related to the availability of these 
benign alternatives and his capability to opt for them. Next to the availability, the price 
and the credibility of the producer as a provider of environmentally friendly products 
are equally important.  
Some authors, like Janssen and Jager (2002, p. 284), think the rationalistic assumption on 
consumer decisions is wrong: “when people decide, they do not engage in economic 
optimising (rational actor type behaviour), but rather use more simple heuristics or engage in 
biased information processing in their evaluation of the relative advantage.” 
The Social Practices Model 
The authors of the Social Practices Model (SPM) see the above described vision on 
consumption decisions as too one-sided. They argue a broader perspective is required (de 
Bakker et al., 2008). Social dilemmas will probably play a role, but other things should be 
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brought in the analysis. They claim that social routines and daily habits have an influence on 
a lower level of consciousness; information campaigns cannot get through to this level. We 
do actions like brushing our teeth, going to work, etc. without really thinking about it. This 
under consciousness is not taken into account in the behavioural models applied by those 
adhering to the rationalistic approach.  
These actions (social practices) are related to day-to-day-life knowledge. Everyone knows 
how, why and when to do them. It is only when they are questioned, often by others, that we 
start thinking about them at a more conscious level (Spaargaren, 1999). 
In Spaargaren‟s SPM, it is not the individual attitude nor the norms or structure that are put at 
the centre, but rather the actual behavioural practices that an individual shares with other 
human agents. In this respect we could e.g. refer to Bartiaux (2008) who illustrates the 
importance of supportive interaction within people‟s social networks in order to be able to 
effectively change behaviour. 
The social practices are in the middle between the human agent, with his lifestyle, and the 
structure, containing the so-called systems of provision. The latter term encompasses the 
availability of green behavioural alternatives: the higher the levels and modes of green 
provisioning, the higher the chances that people will be brought into a position in which the 
greening of their lifestyle segment becomes a feasible option (Spaargaren, 2003). The lack 
of the supply of green alternatives can hinder a person in his social change, even if he or she 
really wants to realise this change. 
Behavioural change for energy savings 
The EU‟s energy saving policy has been largely based on increasing energy efficiency. 
Energy saving by behaviour changes has hardly been the object of real policy making. One 
of the reasons for this development is that it is not clear if, and which, significant energy 
saving can be expected from the behaviour of citizens. (de Bakker et al., 2008) 
A study by McKinsey&Company (2009), however, finds that the energy saving potential of 
behavioural measures is about one fourth of the potential of investment related (or 
technological) measures. At the same time, energy savings resulting from efficiency 
improvements are offset by behavioural factors like an increased use of electric appliances, 
changes in comfort standards, etc. Changing energy behaviour is thus crucial to ensure the 
gains from our efficiency strategies are effectively realized. (McLaren et al., 1998) 
On a conceptual level, a distinction is made between on the one hand people‟s motivation to 
change behaviour, and on the other hand their ability to change their behaviour. Motivating 
forces (as awareness, knowledge, attitudes, norms, habits, etc.) are necessary to bring about 
change, but they are not sufficient. What is needed at the same time are enabling factors 
(financial, technical, organizational, etc.). Next to motivation and enabling factors there is 
also a need for a reinforcing factor (peers, friends, authorities, customers, etc.) if we want the 
individual behavioural changes to become permanent. From a purely theoretical point of view 
such a proposal follows the classical pattern of describing human behaviour as following 
some intrinsic (personal and internal) motivations, but being restricted by external 
constraints, be it financial, technical or social. (Intelligent Energy Europe, 2009) 
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Possible triggers of behaviour change towards more energy saving 
Attitude 
There is no guarantee that people with a higher environmental awareness and motivation to 
save energy will effectively change their energy behaviour. The following quote may still 
summarize the literature: “Although there is little evidence in this study to support the 
attitude-behaviour assumption, this does not mean that such a link does not exist, or that 
there is no causal relationship between attitudes and behaviours. What this study does do, 
however, is to demonstrate that when attitudes are measured as they commonly are, their 
predictive ability is unlikely to be higher than about 30%, and could be much lower.” (Hini et 
al., 1995, p. 28) Also, in more recent research by Vringer et al. (2007, p. 553), the conclusion 
remains that “a self-regulating energy policy, solely based on a strategy of internalising 
environmental responsibility will not be effective in saving energy. There are indications that 
a social dilemma is one of the reasons why people‟s consumption patterns do not conform to 
their value patterns, problem perception or motivation to save energy”. Vringer et al. (2007) 
found no significant differences in the energy requirement of groups of households with 
different value patterns, taking into account the differences in the socio-economic situation of 
households, except for a small difference in the „motivation to energy saving‟: people 
described as „motivated to save energy‟ appeared to have a slightly lower energy 
requirement. A very similar conclusion was reached by Bartiaux (2008) and Gaterleben et al. 
(2002). The research by Gatersleben et al. (2008) showed that self-reported 
proenvironmental behaviour is only marginally related to household energy use. The latter 
rather seems to be related to household size and income. A final confirmation of this 
conclusion can be found in MNP (2007, p. 77): “Household energy use shows no correlation 
with the prioritisation of the climate problem or with the motivation to save energy”.  
These examples show there is not one driving force behind environmentally beneficial 
behaviour. The lack of a relation between household energy consumption and value patterns 
of consumers, their problem perception of climate change as well as their motivation to save 
energy means that a self-regulating energy policy, solely based on a strategy of internalizing 
environmental responsibility will not be effective in saving energy.  
Household income 
Household income is an important determinant of energy use, but the relation is complex. 
According to Anker-Nilssen (2003) this complexity requires greater incentives for households 
to reduce energy use. 
Whereas low income households are more likely to adopt energy saving practices like 
switching off the lights or waiting for a full-loaded washing machine the dwellings of high 
income households, however, are likely to have more energy saving features. High income 
households, however, consume more energy as they seek to save time (e.g. increased 
private car use) and maintain their high comfort level. An examination of Norwegian 
households by Anker-Nilssen (2003) also shows that when the energy price increases 
gradually, low income households save energy while high income households do not react 
much. An unprecedented price hike, on the other hand, rather has the opposite result. 
(Anker-Nilssen, 2003; O‟Doherty et al., 2008) 
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Prices 
Research shows that prices do matter for household (energy) behaviour, but it is suggested 
that they are not the main determinant of energy behaviour (Killian, 2007; Proost et al., 2010; 
Jeeninga et al., 2001). The effect of the price of energy becomes relatively more important 
with decreasing income (Anker-Nilssen, 2003). 
Knowledge 
The criticized rational actor approach presents people as individual agents acting „rationally‟ 
in response to information made available to them. Ignorance about environmental issues 
can be rectified by the provision of information: information will engender concern; and 
concern will translate into behaviour change. This assumption is, however, not supported by 
empirical evidence with respect to energy savings. The SEREC research project on 
residential energy consumption in Belgium found that the more energy saving advices are 
customized the more individuals appreciate them. More general advices are not really used, 
but also more customized advice is often not sufficient to trigger behaviour change. 
Previously unquestioned practices need to become questioned. Besides, there is also a need 
for consistent information through social interaction as well as support from the environment 
of the individuals in order to effectively trigger energy saving behaviour. (Bartiaux, 2008) 
Other determinants 
Other factors that also have an impact on household energy use are: people‟s age and 
socio-economic situation, household size and its composition and the age and architectural 
characteristics of a dwelling as well as the installed energy using equipment. 
Barriers to energy saving behaviour 
The most important conclusion of this paper is that energy use, and energy saving 
behaviour, cannot be empirically explained by studying one single determining factor, 
whether it be attitude, income, prices, culture, information or other.  
According to Spaargaren (2003), a lifestyle is defined as a set of social practices that an 
individual embraces, together with the storytelling that goes along with it. It is clear that a 
sustainable lifestyle cannot be explained by just one parameter. Many barriers are present, 
each of them explaining in part why sustainable behaviour is so hard to put in practice.  
We now provide a list of potential barriers to energy saving behaviour by households. It is 
based on the available theoretical and empirical knowledge that is available in literature: 
- being stuck in habits and old routines, making it difficult to switch to more energy 
friendly behaviour; 
- many policy instruments aim at making the citizen‟s attitude greener, but (1) these 
policies have very limited effectiveness in actually greening them and (2) to the extent 
that they indeed make attitudes greener, the impact of a green attitude on behaviour 
is fairly small; 
- the behaviour and opinions of those belonging to people‟s social network (family, 
reference groups, like neighbours, friends, etc.) is an important determining factor 
(also linked to the social dilemma). This is sometimes called a „lock-in‟ effect; 
- culture may play a role: come measures can be felt as an attack to people‟s freedom 
of choice, privacy or other fundamental values in a certain culture; 
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- particularly in countries where many consumers are shifting to the middle class, a 
rising energy use can be observed; 
- although taxes are one of the most popular policy instruments, their use as an 
instrument to actively steer behaviour in a more sustainable direction is still very 
limited. Many scientist, mainly economists, regard taxation as the most effective type 
of policy instrument to realise behaviour change. However, many barriers remain for 
their implementation, the most important being the general un-popularity of any kind 
of taxation with both business and the general public. Other barriers are the alleged 
existence of negative side effects, both economic (e.g. loss of competitiveness) and 
social (e.g. negative distributional impacts); 
- in cases where economic instruments exist, the tariffs are often too modest to realise 
the desired behavioural shift, or too many exemptions or rebates are granted, which 
erodes their effectiveness; 
- much information on energy saving options is available for citizens, but the 
information is not tailored enough; 
- people may oppose energy savings because they believe this would undermine their 
quality of life. The message accompanying energy saving programmes should, 
therefore, ensure that their effectiveness is not undermined by misconceptions; 
- especially with respect to indirect energy use people may doubt their efforts can 
effectively reduce energy use. People cannot check the actual amount of energy 
saved. A lack of credibility should be prevented by promoting transparency and 
preventing inconsistent messages. 
- the promotion of innovative technologies at an early stage may be risky as these 
technologies may still encounter growing pains. This could hamper the general 
uptake of these technologies at a later stage. 
Identifying these barriers is a first step to overcoming them. However, the difficulty remains to 
find out how strong these barriers are, and when, under what conditions, they play a role. 
2.2.2. Creating new instruments to promote energy savings 
The innovative instruments designed in the INESPO project aim at overcoming some of 
those barriers and promoting energy savings for households. In order to do so, those new 
instruments integrate complementary currencies (or marked-based “white certificates for 
households”) to smart meters. Since the INESPO project is limited to the design phase of 
those new instruments, it is only possible at this stage to highlight potential effect they might 
have on energy savings for households. Further research and trials with the instruments will 
have to be carried out in the future to validate (or not) those effects. Besides, those potential 
effects depend on the choices made for the design of the systems. In the next sections, 
general insights are provided on those potential effects, without differentiating between the 
possible architectures for the system (see Joachain and Klopfert, 2012, for a further 
discussion on the subject).  
Personal benefit and social networks 
The incentive part of the new instruments (complementary currencies or “white certificates”) 
can be seen as relevant in both the rationalistic and the social practices approaches. Indeed, 
a participant can derive personal benefit if he obtains complementary currency units, for 
instance, but he is also participating to a scheme that could be setting new standards at the 
social level. Besides, the innovative coupling of complementary currencies with smart meters 
Project SD/EN/09 – Innovative Instruments for Energy Saving Policies “INESPO” 
SSD-Science for a Sustainable Development - Energy  37 
provides not only an incentive but also more accurate information to the participants on 
energy consumption. If, as it is recommended in the technical part, the participant has an in-
house display and provided the meter reading frequency is high enough, he could even get 
an immediate feed-back on his consumption. Appropriate attention should be given on using 
this new instrument to provide, whenever possible, information tailored to the needs of the 
participants. Besides, the instruments should be conceived as dynamic systems that keep 
participants alerted on different energy saving actions, on various rewards offered, etc. in 
order to sustain motivation over time. The new instruments could then act as motivating, 
enabling and reinforcing factor, removing obstacles typical to the invisibility of energy 
consumption and the lack of reward for energy saving efforts. However, there is more to it 
than the effect such a system could have on separate individuals. Indeed, participating to 
such a collective system could lead to the development of social networks where 
experiences and tips are exchanged, for instance, which could, in turn, bend some social 
practices towards a more sustainable direction.  
Specific features of the new instruments 
Using complementary currencies (CC) offers specific features that are highly relevant in the 
case of energy savings (see Joachain and Klopfert 2012).  
Symbolic value 
As it is often the case for commercial loyalty schemes of major players in the food retail 
industries, the actual value of the points / CC units can be very low (e.g. 0.5% of each Euro 
spent). However, customers can be satisfied with the reward scheme and store loyalty 
increases (Demoulin and Zidda, 2008). 
Since some of the proposed CC systems share similarities regarding their functioning with 
commercial loyalty schemes, this could be extended to the new instruments. In the case of 
the innovative instruments designed in the INESPO project, collecting CC units could even 
have a symbolic value, especially as it is related to a sort of proof of “green behaviour”. This 
differentiates this type of instruments from direct subsidies which are calculated in Euro. The 
use of a CC as units of account allows thus to decouple to some extent motivation from the 
financial system. 
Games and challenges 
Depending on how the new instruments are presented to the public, they could also be 
perceived as a kind of “green challenge” for families. The literature on games used for 
learning (see, for instance, Malone and Lepper, 1987) or for entertainment (see, for instance, 
Hainey et al, 2011) has explored the various reasons to spend time playing. Based on an 
extensive literature review, Hainey et al. state that challenge comes as the first reason to 
play. Besides, they argue that challenge, as well as other factors among which control 
contribute to building intrinsic motivation. 
It can thus be argued that, depending on the way the new instruments are presented to the 
public, they could bring this sense of “green challenge” and control (due to the smart meter) 
which are required to build intrinsic motivation.  
Rebound effect 
Because the CC system allows deciding how to use the CC units obtained, such systems 
have the potential to limit the rebound effect due to incentive part of the scheme. Indeed, if 
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proper attention is given to building the using list, only items which have a limited negative 
impact on the environment can be proposed. Since the CC units are not useable outside of 
the perimeter defined by public authorities, this can limit the rebound effect. This 
differentiates CC systems from Euro-based incentive systems. Indeed, since Euro are 
accepted for any kind of purchase, it is very difficult for public authorities to ensure that the 
subsidies granted do not contribute to a negative impact on the environment in the long run. 
Perspectives for policy making  
Using CC also offers new perspectives for policy making. Indeed, such systems offer the 
possibility for public authorities to design the system in a way that serves their policy 
objectives. In order to do so, they have more parameters (see taxonomy, page 39) than 
when using the Euro. Besides, those parameters can also play on the cost efficiency of CC 
systems compared to direct subsidies, for instance. An example of this is provided when the 
CC system foresees environmental-friendly actions both to obtain and when using the CC 
units. In the E-portemonnee project, for instance, participants can obtain points by following a 
composting course and use them for free public transportation tickets. The positive impact of 
the system on environment-friendly actions is then doubled: It is also frequently observed 
that participants do not use all the CC units they have obtained, thereby lowering the impact 
of the incentive scheme on public budget. Most interestingly, by using a CC unit instead of a 
Euro, policy-makers also have the opportunity to de-couple their policies from the financial 
markets. 
Possible drawbacks 
The issue of privacy is a sensible one regarding the proposed new policy instruments 
designed in the INESPO project. People might reject the system as being too intrusive. 
Moreover the fact that public authorities are trying to set new standards for energy savings 
might also be rejected. Proper attention should thus be given to ensuring privacy (a question 
that has not been touched upon in this project) and to presenting the scheme in a non-
intrusive and non-moralising manner. 
The complexity of the designed instruments is another potential drawback which has been 
explored in the focus groups dedicated to social acceptability. Besides, the architectures on 
which the different system designs are built have also different degrees of social acceptability 
(see 2.4. INESPO - Social acceptability, page 64)  
2.2.3. Objectives and taxonomy 
The analysis of the selected CC systems which was performed in the first work package of 
the INESPO project (see section 2.1. Positioning INESPO, page 20) shed light on the 
importance of carrying on with the study of the constitutive parameters of those systems. 
Therefore, a new task (Task 2.0) was added to the tasks initially planned for the second work 
package. In this new task 2.0, a taxonomy of constitutive parameters for the selected CC 
systems is developed taking into account the coupling with smart metering technology, and 
integrating the insights from the study of white certificates. The resulting hierarchical 
classification of parameters was used as a building tool for the design phase.  
Given the contribution of this taxonomy to the research on CC, the results were presented at 
the 1st International Conference on Community and Complementary Currencies, University 
of Lyon in February 2011 and published in the International Journal of Community Currency 
Research (Joachain and Klopfert, 2012).  
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Before embarking into the taxonomy itself, it is first necessary to define the objectives of the 
project at hand, which are categorised as shown in Figure 7. In the case of the INESPO 
project, those objectives can be defined in the following manner: 
Objectives 
As shown in Figure 7, the objectives of complementary currency systems for sustainability 
can be manifold. However, in the case of the INESPO project, the objective is focusing on 
lowering energy consumption in the household sector. This objective translates into targets 
of energy savings (e.g. 2% for electricity, 4% for gas).  
 
 
Figure 7: Objectives of complementary currencies 
Taxonomy 
The taxonomy for the system architecture is organized in three major blocs: the rules, the 
user access point and the management (see Figure 8). Bearing in mind the core objective 
of the INESPO project (i.e. system design), the emphasize is put on the rules from which the 
perception of the system by the participants derives, as well as on the user access point, 
which comprise the technical elements of the design. Regarding the management, general 
advices is given, since the INESPO project only covers the design phase. Should an 
implementation project take place in the future, however, it would be highly recommended to 
carry further the research on management and governance issues, as they could be key 
factors for the success of such a pilot project.  
The rules 
The rules comprise parameters related to the motivation to participate, the operations 
and the currency (see Figure 8). A is detailed in Joachain and Klopfert (2012, p. 160), “(…) 
in the phase of designing a CC system, the first logical step, once the objective(s) are set, is 
to decide how to motivate people to get on-board. The next step in then to design the 
functioning of the system accordingly, and then to choose the parameters for the currency 
itself. All those choices are interrelated in the sense that they create dependencies, and 
should all contribute to build a consistent CC system.”  
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The definition of the different parameters of the rules, as well as the choices made for those 
parameters in the INESPO system design are given in section 2.3. INESPO - System designs 
The user access point comprises technical features of the system such as device type, 
data, capabilities, feedback, etc. (see Figure 8). This part of the taxonomy deals with how 
the actors identified in the INESPO system interact (e.g. how do households view their 
account or how the back-office assigns CC units to households). Such use cases, as well as 
architecture outline and first approximation of underlying database are described in section 
2.3.5. System design: Technical aspects. 
 
 
Figure 8: Hierarchical classification of parameters for the CC systems (from Joachain and Klopfert, 2012, p. 161) 
2.2.4. The 4 preliminary steps of the system design 
Selection of the architectural models 
The work carried out on the taxonomy sheds light on the importance of the choice of the 
model in the design of the systems. Indeed, the research on the possible rationale for the 
model reveals a polarity between what we have called a rewarding and a regulatory 
architecture. The project E-portemonnee in Limburg is a perfect example of a rewarding 
model: CC units are given for specific sustainable behaviours detailed in a list set forth by 
each participating municipality. The actions are thus “rewarded” by public authorities in the 
CC system. In the framework of the INESPO project, using such a rewarding model implies 
to use relative consumption reduction to reward changes in behaviours and investments 
in energy efficiency, each household making their “best effort” to reduce their energy 
demand.  
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Using a regulatory model is an option which has not been implemented yet but has been 
proposed for CC systems (see Lietaer and Takada, 2010). This type of model is radically 
different as it based on mandatory participation and the willingness to comply with 
regulations put in place by public authorities. Such a regulatory system allows working on 
the total energy consumption and setting quota or targets for household energy 
consumption.  
It follows that the choice between a rewarding and a regulatory model orients the systems 
on radically different paths. For designing the INESPO systems, it was thus decided to build: 
A rewarding system (S1) where households participate to the system on a voluntary basis 
and are “rewarded” by public authorities for their energy savings. This occurs in two major 
ways: 
- Households can obtain complementary currency (CC) units through their relative 
consumption reduction over a given period of time (Δ in consumption) 
- Households can obtain CC units for some specific actions related to increasing a 
dwellings‟ energy performance, buying basic energy efficient appliances / products, 
energy audit, maintenance, as well as energy education.  
A regulatory system (S2) with mandatory participation of every household and the setting 
up of quota or targets for household energy consumption.  
S2 requires realistic targets which are calculated for households taking some elements of 
their profile into account. Each household obtains a number of CC units that corresponds to 
their energy targets.  
As a household consumes energy, it also uses CC units accordingly. At the end of the period 
for which the target was set, a given household energy consumption can  
- meet their energy target: all CC units have been used 
- be more than their energy target: they have to buy the missing CC units at a penalty 
rate fixed by public authorities 
- be less than their energy target: they have remaining CC units which they can sell to 
public authorities at a discounted rate. 
However, carrying on with the design of S1 and S2, two major drawbacks for those systems 
were identified: 
- the rewarding system (S1) could be perceived as unfair for over-rewarding the 
households which had done the least efforts yet (and penalising the households 
which had done the most efforts),  
- the regulatory system (S2) was most likely to cause major problems for households 
with high above-average consumption to comply with the energy consumption 
targets. 
Faced with this problem, a first methodological choice was not to try to develop mechanisms 
to “fix” S1 and S2 (e.g. by setting a cap system for S1 for example), but rather to conceive 
them as two extreme systems, each at one end of the spectrum of possible architecture 
designs. The second methodological choice that derived from this initial choice was to 
develop a third system, called a hybrid system (S3) that would combine “the best from both 
worlds”. 
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Selection of the technical options 
A working implementation of the INESPO schemes mainly rests on the availability of good 
user profiles, thus making valid energy consumption measurements necessary. This is where 
smart metering is essential, as it is the only way of effectively collecting and managing 
consumption data on a regular basis. In Belgium, there is no political decision yet regarding 
smart meter roll-out, but the main actors in the (electricity) market are involved in pilot tests. 
Besides, as requested by the European Commission, cost-benefit analyses for smart meter 
deployment have been carried out in the three Regions, Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia 
(e.g. PWC for Brussels, 2012).  
The INESPO project is aiming at building new opportunities for energy savings in the 
household sector, should a smart meter deployment take place. As argued in section “ 
2.6. Position Paper”, the forces at play (e.g. push from the industry, smart grid 
management) make it likely that smart meters will enter households anyway in the future, 
however, there is still great uncertainty on how, when and what kind of smart metering 
infrastructure will be deployed. Therefore, it was decided to work with two technical options:  
- A base scenario: The base scenario is realizable on short/medium term. In this 
scenario, neither the metering infrastructure nor the meter itself can be accessed 
directly by the INESPO system. It provides remote reading of the measurement 
indexes without any further processing. The typical user interface will be using a 
browser on a personal computer.  
- An advanced scenario: The advanced scenario is defined by extending the base 
scenario and, although it is a preferred scenario in the framework of the INESPO 
project, it would require a strong political support to be implemented. In this scenario, 
smart meters can be extended to incorporate INESPO specific functions. It foresees 
in-home displays, recharging/redeeming at home, driven by an extendable smart 
meter platform (possibility to add/change services to smart meters remotely).  
Baseline and profile computation 
Since S2 and S3 are based on a regulatory model, with the obligation for households to 
participate, it is of uppermost importance to define which parameters have to be taken into 
consideration for computing the energy targets households will have to comply with. Both 
architectures require thus to determine which parameters will be used to define households 
profiles, taking into account their diversity. Based on their profile, baselines are then set for 
households, as well as saving objectives. This computation results in energy target that are 
realistic for each household taking into account some of their specificities. Besides, it is 
important to be able to process the measured data to be able to differentiate energy savings 
due to changed behaviour from energy saving due to changes in the context of the consumer 
(such as new or less family members at home, change of appliances, etc.). Setting the 
targets right is considered as a responsibility of the INESPO governance.  
The focus of this task is thus put on studying which parameters are most important to take 
into account. The following diagram (Figure 9) shows possible parameters for the baseline 
(profile) computation in order to set the energy targets. The information required, as well as 
the entity where the information would have to be retrieved (i.e. Supplier, Local 
Administration or Social Security) is also shown on the graph. Some parameters, which had 
been initially listed as potentially impacting the energy consumption, have not been taken 
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into account (marked with a red dot). This recommendation for the choice of parameters is 
mostly done bearing in mind the necessity to operate a trade-off between being fair in the 
choices of parameters that reflect the differences between households, and keeping the 
system workable and relatively simple to implement. 
 
Figure 9: Parameters necessary for profile computation and their sources 
Regarding the computation of the baseline and the targets themselves, a methodology based 
on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) could serve as a reference for public authorities, 
bearing in mind that the final decision will rest on other considerations as well (targets set by 
the EU, etc.). Indeed, PCA allows to extract a “typical behavior” out of a collection of power 
profiles. This way, a single profile can be compared to the “average” to evaluate how good or 
bad this specific household‟s behavior is. Of course, some clustering or segmentation has to 
be done first to differentiate between e.g. household size, inhabitant‟s income, … so that the 
comparison is fair. 
Additionally, the confidence on the number needs to be determined in order to derive its 
statistical significance when applied to different consumer groups. This could lay the 
foundation to define the “energy targets” that would be set for households in S2 and S3. 
INESPO System boundaries, actors and functions 
Applying the UML diagram methodology, the boundaries, actors and functions of the 
INESPO system are determined as shown in Figure 10. The INESPO system boundaries 
includes participants (households), partners (merchants), the whole INESPO structure (back 
and front office), as well as the meter data manager (MDM). Other actors with whom 
interactions are foreseen (i.e. mostly for data transfer) are outside of the system boundaries, 
such as Energy Suppliers or Administration. 
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Figure 10: Boundaries of the INESPO system 
The INESPO system comprises the following actors, with their main functions: 
Household: A single household that is participating in the INESPO system 
INESPO Back Office (Database, Processing, Interaction) 
Main functions:  
- Getting the necessary data (from the MDM / Supplier, Social Security, Administration) 
- Tracking the INESPO side (versus MDM data) of the energy consumption history. 
- Computing and allocating INESPO‟s 
- Managing accounts in INESPO‟s  
- Computing statistics  
- Storing consumer account status (monetary system, management of Complementary 
Currencies (CCs)). This is further referred to as the account database. 
- CC or points calculation service. 
INESPO Front-end: Responsible for user interaction. 
Main functions: 
- Managing the obtaining – using and transfer of INESPO‟s  
MDM of the DSO: The Meter Data Management system of the DSO. 
Merchant: The owner of shop that has a terminal for INESPO‟s. 
Supplier, Social Security & Administration: The databases from external parties needed 
for profile, baseline and target computation. 
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2.3. INESPO - System designs 
The three systems designed for the INESPO project (S1, S2 and S3) which are presented in 
this section are based on the taxonomy (see page 39). A definition of each parameter is 
given prior to the description of the choices made for the parameters within a given 
architecture. 
The logical order for designing the systems is also derived from the taxonomy and comprises 
three steps. Once the objective(s) for the system are set, the first logical step is to decide 
how to motivate households to get on board. Three main parameters are impacting the 
motivation to participate to CC systems: the model chosen, as well as the way to obtain and 
use the CC units. 
The second step is then to design the functioning of the system. Those parameters are 
detailed in the operation sub-section, which comprises obtaining (earning / buying) and 
using (using-exiting) the CC units. 
The third and last step of this phase is to design the currency itself. The parameters that 
have to be defined relate to the form and value of the currency, as well as its lifetime and 
convertibility. A last parameter that has to be covered is whether or not the currency bears 
(negative) interest with the demurrage / interest parameter. 
Those three steps (motivation – operation – currency) belong to the same rationale of 
setting the „rules‟ for the CC system.  
The following paragraphs describe the rules for the 3 different systems designs:  
- S1 : built on a rewarding architecture 
- S2 : built on a regulatory architecture 
- S3 : built on a hybrid architecture mixing regulatory and rewarding aspects 
The last section is dedicated to the technical aspects of the systems. 
2.3.1. System design 1 (S1): Rewarding architecture 
The Rules - Motivation to participate 
Model [The „model‟ describes what kind of rationale is used for the system as a whole to 
motivate households to participate] 
In the architecture of S1, CC units are given (using a “push” mechanism) to households 
when they perform specific sustainable actions according to the rules defined in the 
'obtaining' parameter. The terminology „rewarding‟ is preferred to the terminology „voluntary‟. 
Indeed, „voluntary‟ does allow differentiating this type of systems from grassroots CC 
systems based on reciprocity (i.e. LETS, Time Banks). Both types of systems can be 
voluntary, but the term „rewarding‟ is consistent with the fact that the INESPO system is 
intending to create a policy instrument which promotes and rewards energy savings in the 
household sector. 
Obtaining [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to obtain 
CC units in such a way that it motivates them to participate] 
In S1, the model chosen is a rewarding model, and obtaining rules should be built in a way to 
make sense to participants, notwithstanding the fact that they have to be in line with the 
objectives of the INESPO project and take into account the need for objective measurement. 
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Since S1 is a rewarding system, the obtaining – earning rules are based on the behaviours 
that the project wants to promote, keeping in mind the central objective of the INESPO 
project which is the reduction of energy consumption by households. It follows logically that 
the difference in energy consumption for each participating household (Δ in consumption) 
should serve as a basis for earning CC units. For example, on a yearly basis, this reduction 
is defined as 
ΔC = Cy – Cy-1 (where Cy stands for the energy consumption of a household during year y). 
A very important remark at this stage is that, although capping the initial energy consumption 
would have been a possibility to avoid over-rewarding the households which have done the 
least efforts yet, it was decided not to do this within this exploratory study, in order to bring 
the system S1 to its limits (see positive and negative aspects of S1 summarized at the end of 
the system description).  
On top of this central way of earning CC units, some specific actions are also rewarded. The 
rationale used to select those actions is the following: 
- Providing coherence by strictly sticking to the objective of reducing energy 
consumption in the dwelling of the households (target group) 
- Targeting behavioural changes through modifying the external and internal context in 
which the selected behaviours have to take place. 
- Targeting behavioural changes through providing information / education 
This has many implications. A first major implication is that the perimeter of the actions that 
are rewarded is limited to the dwellings of the households (target group of the INESPO 
project). Other „eco-friendly‟ behaviours related to transport for instance, are thus not 
selected. A second major implication is that actions that do not, strictu senso, reduce energy 
consumption are also not selected. For instance, actions like switching to green electricity or 
producing electricity in the home are not rewarded (no reduction of energy consumption), 
whereas placing a solar boiler for instance can be rewarded because it reduces the total 
energy consumed from sources external to the dwelling. A third implication which is more 
related to changing the external and internal context and avoiding the rebound effect is that 
only a limited number of energy efficient domestic appliances (related to basic needs) are 
eligible for reward (based on best energy label on the market). Besides, in order to avoid that 
older and less efficient appliances are kept, bringing used appliances to recycling parks (or 
asking the seller of the new appliance to take it back) is also rewarded. A fourth implication in 
relation to information / education is that actions related to energy education are also 
rewarded (e.g. energy audit, energy education courses).   
Using [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to use the 
CC units they have obtained in such a way that it motivates them to participate. Different 
choices are possible, which include the possibility to use CC units in shops (merchants). In 
this case, a possible rationale might then be to establish mechanisms to help CC units being 
exchanged as much as possible between merchants before they exit the system.] 
Since S1 is a rewarding system, this is a key parameter to bring participants on board. 
Therefore, the following rationale was chosen: 
- Increasing the motivation to participate and making the system more attractive by 
enlarging the scope vis-à-vis the core objective of reducing household energy 
consumption 
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- However, ensuring coherence both for the users and as a system 
- Targeting behavioural changes through modifying the external and internal context in 
which the selected behaviours have to take place. 
Those choices have, as it was the case for the obtaining rationale, clear implications. 
Obviously, a balance has to be achieved between enlarging the scope and ensuring 
coherence. In order to do so, the following guidelines are used: the actions that entitle to 
earn CC units are all eligible for using. For example, if a household invests in double glazing, 
they get rewarded with CC units. Those CC units can be used for all the actions of the 
obtaining list which the household wants to perform later (as in a loyalty scheme). However, 
in order to make the using list more attractive, other actions like investing in photovoltaic 
installation or switching to green electricity are also eligible to use the CC units (this will of 
course depend on the agreements with the installers, energy suppliers, etc.). Using the CC 
units in shops (merchants) also seemed a very interesting option. However, this option drives 
even further the problem of coherence, an especially in terms of systemic coherence. 
Indeed, INESPO has no commercial objectives and it is not intended to run a whole system 
which includes pay-back to merchants. To overcome this problem, it seems best to seek 
ways to convert CC units from the INESPO system into other existing systems. This option 
has two major advantages: the first one is to use existing systems instead of duplicating 
them (e.g. Ecochèques, for instance), and the second one is that it also makes possible to 
link this system with existing or forthcoming CC systems that have compatible objectives 
(e.g. E-portemonnee, for instance). Once again, this will depend on the agreements made 
with those other systems, as well as on technical feasibility. 
The Rules - Operation 
Obtaining - Earning [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to earn CC units] 
A central way to earn CC units is based on Δ C as measured from one period to another by 
the smart meter infrastructure. 
Besides, a list of actions also enables households to earn CC units. This obtaining-earning 
list is built taking into account the guidelines developed for the motivation – obtaining 
parameter. A complete list has been proposed, which comprises: 
- Investments for increasing a dwellings‟ energy performance (such as investing in high 
efficiency glazing, replacing single or double glazing, in a dwelling‟s air tightness, 
placing a condensing gas fired boiler, thermal solar energy installations, etc.) 
- Buying services that may benefit a dwelling‟s energy performance (such as energy 
audit, maintenance and control, etc.) 
- Buying basic energy efficient appliances / products (such as fridge, washing machine 
with the best Energy label on the market: A, A+, A++, plus returning the old appliance 
that is replaced, etc.)  
- Energy education (such as following a formation de „Guides énergie‟ 
http://www.walhain.be/services-aux-citoyens/environnement/energie/formation-de-
guides-energie or on URE http://www.formation-construform.be/formations/utilisation-
rationnelle-de-lenergie-ure/) 
Obtaining – Buying [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to buy CC units] 
Considering the fact that S1 is a rewarding system, buying CC units is not foreseen. 
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Using [Describes the mechanisms put in place to allow the circulation of the obtained CC 
units between participants to the system] 
In S1, a using list is built for households to use their obtained CC units. This list is taking into 
account the guidelines developed for the motivation-using parameter.  
This using list mainly comprises further investments in all the actions from the obtaining-
earning list (such as investing in high efficiency glazing, performing an energy audit, buying a 
fridge with the best Energy label on the market or following an energy education course).  
Some complementary items are taken into consideration for the using list, in order to make 
the system more attractive for households, such as: 
- Investing in the dwellings‟ risk of overheating (Sun screens, Shadowing) 
- Investing in renewable heat production (Photovoltaic installations, Wind mills) 
Besides, other possibilities should be explored such as: 
- Paying green electricity bills (provided agreements are concluded with suppliers) 
- Converting into CC units from other existing systems that have compatible objectives 
(provided proper agreements and infrastructure are put in place). Conversion to the 
following schemes may potentially be considered: 
Ecochèques 
E-portemonnee 
Eco-Iris 
Since INESPO‟s objective is focused on energy savings and not on creating a commercial 
network, no mechanism is put in place to help CC units being exchanged between 
merchants. However, a mechanism is foreseen for merchants (commercial partners to the 
projects such as double glazing installers or shops selling energy efficient appliances) who 
want to convert their CC units back into Euro.   
Using – Exiting [Describes the mechanisms put in place for the use of CC-units that 
involves their exiting of the system] 
Typically this occurs when merchants that have accepted CC units as means of payment for 
their goods and services, want to convert their CC units back into Euro. A convertibility-
exchanging rate is then foreseen for them.  
Besides, in order to provide an “exit gate” to participating households, it is foreseen that they 
can convert their CC units into Euros. However, a major discount (e.g. 50% discounted value 
compared to value in the using list) is then applied to promote using CC units according to 
the using list. 
The Rules - Currency 
Form [Describes the vehicle chosen for circulation of the CC units. Several choices are 
possible for the vehicle, but a first basic choice is whether to use a paper or electronic form. 
In the case of an electronic form, a second choice has to be made between electronic local 
or remote. Finally, in case of an electronic remote vehicle, the need arises to define the 
database server as well as the identification means.] 
Using an electronic form with remote storage is highly recommended for the INESPO 
system, considering the smart meter infrastructure it is based on. A first overview of the 
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database server is provided in the technical description of the system (see 2.3.5. System 
design: Technical aspects). 
Value [Describes the unit of account chosen for the CC as well as the standard(s) in relation 
to which the CC-units are evaluated. Those standards can be multiple, anchored in official 
currencies or not.]   
For S1, the unit of account is “1 INESPO”. For the S1 architecture, the value of 1 INESPO is 
anchored in multiple standards: 
- 1 INESPO is equal to 1 kWh of primary energy saved 
- equivalence in INESPO‟s for each item of the obtaining – earning list (e.g. 100 
INESPO‟s per m2 of high efficiency glazing replacing single or double glazing, 500 
INESPO‟s for an energy audit, etc.) 
- equivalence in INESPO‟s for each item in the using list (e.g. 1 INESPO is worth 0,10 
Euro for investing in high efficiency glazing or buying a fridge with the best Energy 
label on the market; 1 INESPO is worth 0,5 kWh green electricity, 250 INESPO‟s are 
needed for an energy education course, etc.) 
Informal value [This parameter is used when it is not a formal relation but rather an informal 
relation to a given standard that is used to evaluate the CC-units] 
In the case of S1, an informal value could be used to determine the equivalence in INESPO‟s 
for some items of the obtaining-earning and the using list (e.g. rule of thumb is that 1 
INESPO is more or less equivalent to 0,10 Euro) 
Lifetime [This parameter describes the validity period of the CC unit] 
For the S1 system, the lifetime of the CC units is less critical than in S2, but should take into 
account two facts. On the one hand, the lifetime of the CC units should not exceed the period 
for which the necessary budget has been assigned. On the other hand, the lifetime should be 
long enough to enable households to use the CC units they have obtained. A period between 
2 and 5 years seems optimal. 
Convertibility – Buying [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for buying CC 
units] 
Since S1 is a rewarding model, it is not expected that households will buy CC units and, as a 
consequence, no convertibility-buying rate is foreseen.  
Convertibility – Exchanging [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for 
exchanging CC units] 
In the case of S1, a convertibility rate is foreseen for merchants that have accepted CC units 
as means of payment for their goods and services, and exchange those CC units back 
against Euros. 
Convertibility – Selling [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for selling CC 
units] 
As an exit gate for the households who do not want to use their CC units according to what is 
offered in the using list, a convertibility rate is also foreseen for them to sell their CC units at 
a discounted value (e.g. 50% of the average value of a CC unit from the using list)  
Demurrage - Interest [This parameter indicates whether the CC unit is losing (demurrage) 
or gaining (interest) value with time] 
Project SD/EN/09 – Innovative Instruments for Energy Saving Policies “INESPO” 
SSD-Science for a Sustainable Development - Energy  50 
In the case of S1, no demurrage/interest is foreseen. 
Strengths and weaknesses – S1 
Strengths:  
- S1 has the potential to promote energy savings among those who are consuming the 
most, and have made little to no effort yet to reduce their consumption. Indeed, it will 
be the easiest for them to make the necessary investments and be rewarded by the 
system. 
- S1 is more attractive (rewarding) and socially acceptable (voluntary participation). 
- In its mechanism, S1 is close to a subsidy, although in CC. 
- Through the obtaining-earning and using lists, S1 allows for public authorities to focus 
on specific aspects of their energy saving policies. 
Weaknesses: 
- This system over-rewards households which are consuming the most and have made 
no efforts yet to reduce their consumption. On the contrary, households which have 
already made all necessary investments and efforts to change their behaviours are 
penalised. Indeed, it is more difficult for those who have already made the necessary 
investments to continue reducing their energy consumption. In this sense, this system 
can be seen as over-rewarding those who have made the least efforts yet and 
penalising those who have made the most efforts towards reducing their energy 
consumption. 
- Because S1 is based on a voluntary participation, its impact is reduced in comparison 
to a regulatory system. 
- There is a risk of free-riding in S1. 
- This system needs public subsidies to function. It is not self-sustaining, and is costly 
to public authorities. 
- This system has a tendency to “kill itself over time”. Indeed, as households perform 
the actions that the system promotes, they have less and less opportunity to earn CC 
units over time. 
2.3.2. System design 2 (S2): Regulatory architecture 
The Rules - Motivation to participate 
Model [The „model‟ describes what kind of rationale is used for the system as a whole to 
motivate households to participate] 
In the architecture of S2, the system is based on a model with mandatory participation of 
every household. The terminology „regulatory‟ was preferred to the terminology mandatory 
for this model because it implies that the energy saving objectives are regulated by public 
authorities. 
According to the two proposals with regulatory models that were described previously (i.e. 
Biwa Kippu and TEQs, page 22), two main options are possible for a regulatory model. 
The first option is close to the mechanism of a civil service or „tax-like‟ system using CC (see 
Biwa Kippu proposal, Lietaer and Takada, 2010). According to this rationale, households 
have to provide a certain number of CC-units on a defined time basis (ex: 100 INESPO per 
year for each household). Applying this rationale to INESPO, those CC-units would be 
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earned through reducing energy consumption. This option was, however, considered unfair. 
Indeed, considering the energy reduction objective of INESPO, this would have implied that 
all households should have to reduce their energy consumption to provide the requested 
number of CC units at the end of a given period, regardless of the efforts they had already 
made in the past to reduce their consumption. As it is commonly accepted that the most cost-
effective and straightforward actions are most likely to be taken first, using such a rationale 
would penalise households which have already made the most efforts towards energy 
savings. Besides, since S2 is, unlike S1, based on a regulatory model, those households 
would not have the choice to opt out of the system. Therefore, using such a rationale to build 
S2 was rejected.  
The second option, which is selected for S2 is based on energy targets. This type of model is 
close to a quota system using CC units (see TEQ‟s proposal, Fleming and Chamberlin, 
2011). Indeed, energy targets are calculated for households taking some elements of their 
profile into account. In this sense, the system can be considered as “fair” (households with 
similar profiles get similar targets) provided the parameters for profile computation are 
properly chosen. Each household receives a number of CC units that corresponds to their 
energy targets. As a household consumes energy, it also consumes CC units accordingly. At 
the end of the period for which the target was set, a given household can either break even 
(energy targets are met, all CC units have been used) or have consumed more or less than 
its target. In the case it has consumed more, it has to buy extra CC units (penalty). If, on the 
contrary, it has consumed less than its target, it can sell back its remaining CC units 
(reward). The price paid for energy itself remains unaffected in the INESPO S2 system. 
However, the fact that households earn or pay some extra Euros for CC units according to 
their consumption has a global effect that can be close to a progressive tariff if the price paid 
for energy and the gains/penalties for CC units are both taken into account. 
Obtaining [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to obtain 
CC units in such a way that it motivates them to participate] 
Since there is an obligation for each household to participate to the system in the S2 design, 
the focus is not on motivating households through attractive obtaining and using rules. The 
motivation for households to participate comes from their willingness to comply with 
regulation put in place by public authorities. However, much attention must be dedicated to 
determining the energy targets for households in a way that makes sense to them and is 
socially acceptable. In this sense, the selection of parameters for profile computation is a 
very sensitive point. Obviously, a trade-off has to be done between taking the particulars of 
household‟s situations into account and keeping the system fair, simple and manageable 
(see page 39 for a proposal of parameters for profile computation). Those energy targets 
must also be in line with public authorities‟ objectives in terms of energy consumption 
reduction.  
Using [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to use the 
CC units they have obtained in such a way that it motivates them to participate] 
In S2, the using rules will be defined in relation to the absolute consumption of the 
households. This overlaps the remark made above regarding the importance of setting the 
energy targets properly. The rationale for the using parameter must also take into account 
the fact that if the energy targets were not properly set, it would be most detrimental to the 
durability of the system (i.e. if most of the households would be in excess of CC units at the 
end of a period). Indeed, this would pose a problem in terms of setting the energy targets 
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properly for the next period if households are allowed to use the CC units they have spared 
for the next period. If, on the contrary CC units in excess cannot be used for the next period 
and are to be sold at a heavy discount, this would be a major disincentive. 
The Rules - Operation 
Obtaining - Earning [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to earn CC units] 
Since S2 is a regulatory model based on energy targets, this parameter describes the 
principles / formula for computing the energy targets, which translate into the number of CC 
units allotted to each household. Those targets are based on households‟ profiles that take 
into account a few selected parameters. At this stage, it is too soon to envisage an actual 
formula. Indeed, selecting the relevant parameters and deciding about their respective 
weight in the formula results from choices made at the governance level. In the INESPO 
project the aim is limited to designing innovative policy instruments. If, in the future, public 
authorities decide to test and use those instruments, a proper governance structure will have 
to be put in place which will have to decide, amongst others, about those issues. Proper 
attention should be given to making this information clear and understandable to all 
households. In this system design phase, research was carried out to provide some general 
recommendations on parameters that could be selected for profile computation. The 
following parameters –Energy Performance Certificate of the building (EPC), heating type, 
rent / owner, number of persons in households, usage (first of second residence, etc.), 
employed/ unemployed- were singled out as having potentially an important impact on 
household energy consumption. An overview of the data bases from which the needed 
information could be retrieved is provided in Figure 9.  
Obtaining – Buying [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to buy CC units] 
In S2, households which consume more energy than their energy targets are in shortage of 
CC units. They have the obligation to buy from public authorities the CC units that are 
missing. The convertibility-buying rate for CC units is set in Euro by public authorities. 
Ultimately, this drills down to paying a penalty in Euro for consuming more than the energy 
target. To keep in line with the energy saving objective of the system, it is recommended that 
the Euro collected as penalty are centralised in a fund that will be used to promote 
investments in energy efficiency (e.g. insulation work, etc.) by households. The amount of 
Euro which a given household has paid should be recorded in the database of this fund. If, 
within a given period (e.g. 3 year) this household invests in energy efficiency, the fund would 
reimburse part of what has been paid. However, a percentage (e.g. 50%) of the amount 
would be retained by public authorities to cover the costs of the system (e.g. 10% for running 
costs and 40% to buy CC units back from households with energy consumption below 
target). A recommendation would be to match those investments with those eligible for 
subsidies. In this way, a single file could be entered by households to ask for the subsidy and 
to get an extra financial support under the form of the Euro the household had paid to the 
INESPO fund.  
Except for the obligation of buying CC units from public authorities when a household has 
consumed more energy than its target, there is no other possibility foreseen to buy CC units 
in the S2 system.   
It must be noted that using an electronic form for the CC units allows traceability, and that 
thereby exchanges between households participating to the system can be avoided.  
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A variant of this system design has been developed with a market-based “white certificates 
for households” scenario that allows exchanges between participants (see below).  
Using [Describes the mechanisms put in place to allow the circulation of the obtained CC 
units between participants to the system] 
In the S2 design, there is no circulation of CC units. The only way of using CC units which is 
foreseen is related to energy consumption and is described in using-exiting.  
Using – Exiting [Describes the mechanisms put in place for the use of CC-units that 
involves their exiting of the system] 
In the S2 design, which is based on energy targets, the CC-units a given household receives 
at the start of a period are used simultaneously with the energy consumption. For example, 
regarding electricity consumption measured by the smart meter technology, let‟s suppose a 
given household receives 10,000 CC units (equivalent to a target of 10,000 kWhp of primary 
energy = 4.000 kWh of electricity consumption) for a year. With every kWh electricity 
consumed (equivalent to 2.5 kWhp), 2.5 unit of CC units are used by the household. Those 
2.5 CC units exit the system. The total electricity consumption of the household for the year 
is either equal to 4,000 kWh (break-even) or above 4,000 kWh (obligation to buy CC units), 
or below 4,000 kWh (possibility to sell CC units). 
Convertibility rates are fixed by public authorities for buying and selling CC units. 
The Rules - Currency 
Form [Describes the vehicle chosen for circulation of the CC units] 
Using an electronic form with remote storage is mandatory for the S2 design to allow 
traceability. 
Value [Describes the unit of account chosen for the CC as well as the standard(s) in relation 
to which the CC-units are evaluated] 
For the S2 architecture, the value of 1 INESPO is equal to 1 kWh primary energy (= 0.4 kWh 
of electricity). 
Informal value [This parameter is used when it is not a formal relation but rather an informal 
relation to a given standard that is used to evaluate the CC-units] 
No informal value is foreseen in the S2 design, since the public authorities define the 
convertibility rate. 
Lifetime [This parameter describes the validity period of the CC unit] 
For the S2 system, the lifetime of INESPO should not exceed the period for which the targets 
are given, in order to be able to restart with new energy targets and new CC units for the 
next period. 
Convertibility – Buying [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for buying CC 
units] 
A convertibility – buying rate is fixed by public authorities at the beginning of each period. 
This convertibility-buying rate only applies to the case when households are in the obligation 
to buy CC units from public authorities because they have consumed more energy than their 
target.  
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Convertibility – Exchanging [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for 
exchanging CC units] 
In the case of the S2 design, no exchange of CC units is foreseen and therefore no 
convertibility – exchanging rate fixed. 
Convertibility – Selling [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for selling CC 
units] 
A convertibility – selling rate is fixed by public authorities at the beginning of each period. 
This convertibility – selling rate only applies to the case when households have the possibility 
to sell CC units to public authorities because they have consumed less energy than their 
targets. However, the convertibility – selling rate is lower than the convertibility – buying rate. 
Indeed, the rationale of the S2 design is that households achieve their energy targets and not 
so much that they outperform their targets (not a rewarding system). 
Demurrage - Interest [This parameter indicates whether the CC unit is losing (demurrage) 
or gaining (interest) value with time] 
In the case of the S2 design, this is not foreseen. 
Strengths and weaknesses - S2 
Strengths 
- Every household has to participate to the system 
- Targets can be set for energy consumption (energy policy) 
- Financial sustainability of the system (once installed) if targets are properly set  
- Depending on the choices made for the parameters of the calculation of energy 
targets, the rationale of the system can be relatively easy to understand (“everyone 
gets an energy target”) 
Weaknesses 
- Households that are high above the energy targets when the system is put in place 
will have major problems to comply 
- Setting targets which are too difficult to reach is not acceptable. 
- The S2 architecture is vulnerable to an excess of CC units (too much CC units 
allotted = energy targets too easy to reach). Special attention should be given to 
establishing the energy targets in this respect. 
- Setting the targets properly is also a very sensitive issue for the perceived fairness of 
S2 by households (including the parameters for profile computation) 
- Setting the penalties right is also sensitive 
- There is a risk of energy consumption shift in S2 (to other sector or to other energy 
sources such as wood pellets or coal for instance) 
- The fact that CC units in excess are convertible at a discounted rate is not giving a 
high incentive to outperform the energy targets set and might be perceived as unfair. 
- S2 is close to a tax/ tariff system for those exceeding their energy targets, and is most 
likely to be perceived in a negative way. This has to be compared with other options 
to reach the same energy savings objectives. A key parameter for social acceptability 
is the way the energy targets are calculated. 
- Households might need an adaptation period in order to understand the functioning of 
the system (how to buy/exchange CC units, etc.)  
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Further considerations 
Fairness 
The way to calculate the energy targets is crucial for the perceived fairness of the S2 system. 
Tenant / Owner  
The S2 architecture might be more relevant for owners who have the possibility to do some 
energy efficient investments when needed. However, since the PEB of rented housing is 
becoming mandatory, this could be used as a corrective factor for tenants. It is 
recommended to seek further mechanisms to promote investments from owners in rented 
housing. However, the behavioural part of the system is equally valid for tenants and owners. 
2.3.3. Variant of S2 with market-based “white certificates for households”  
Considering the similarities of the constitutive parameters of white certificates and 
complementary currency schemes, extending the concept of white certificates to the 
household sector as obliged party translates, in the framework of the INESPO project, into 
designing a system of complementary currencies based on an obligatory architecture with a 
marked-based system of exchange. This variant of the S2 system is described in the 
following sections with the specification for all the parameters which are not identical to those 
described for S2. 
The Rules - Motivation to participate 
Using [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to use the 
CC units they have obtained in such a way that it motivates them to participate] 
On top of the rationale for obtaining and using CC units according to their energy targets 
(such as described in S2), households have the possibility to trade their CC units. 
Households having CC units in excess (i.e. whose energy consumption is lower than their 
energy target) and those having a shortage of CC units (i.e. whose energy consumption is 
above their energy target) are thus entitled to exchange their CC units, in an eBay type 
virtual market.  
The Rules - Operation 
Obtaining – Buying [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to buy CC units] 
In this variant of S2, the obligation to buy from public authorities the CC units that are 
missing is still valid. However, households that are missing CC units due to their 
consumption being higher than their targets have the opportunity to try to buy CC units on 
the market of “white certificates for households”. Those exchanges should be traceable and 
limited to a maximum number of CC units per household to avoid that it becomes a 
commercial operation. 
Using [Describes the mechanisms put in place to allow the circulation of the obtained CC 
units between participants to the system] 
In this variant of S2, circulation is allowed between participants who can use their extra CC 
units to sell them on the market of “white certificates for households”. 
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The Rules - Currency 
Convertibility – Buying [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for buying CC 
units] 
Convertibility – Selling [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for selling CC 
units] 
On top of the fixed rate determined by public authorities, convertibility –buying and selling 
rates are fluctuating according to market mechanisms for CC units on the “white certificates 
for households” market. 
Strengths and weaknesses - Variant of S2 with market-based mechanism 
Strengths 
- Efficient way of reaching targets according to mainstream economic theories 
- Potentially less expensive for households that are high above targets 
- Could create extra motivation to consume less than targets (limited stream of extra 
revenues at potentially higher rates than the convertibility – selling rate fixed by public 
authorities) 
Weaknesses 
Lower autonomy of the system as it is linked to the Euro and the fluctuations of the financial 
sphere. 
Public authorities lose control to some extent on the target / penalty equilibrium of the system 
Could lower motivation for households that are high above targets to take appropriate 
measures for energy savings (as extra CC units are available at potentially lower rates that 
the convertibility – buying rate fixed by public authorities). 
Could make the system less sustainable on a financial basis for public authorities 
Especially sensitive to an excess of CC units (too much CC units allotted = energy targets 
set too generously). 
2.3.4. System design 3 (S3): Hybrid architecture 
The Rules - Motivation to participate 
Model [The „model‟ describes what kind of rationale is used for the system as a whole to 
motivate households to participate] 
Taking the strengths and weaknesses of S1 and S2 into account, S3 is designed as a hybrid 
system integrating elements of a rewarding architecture into a regulatory model.  
Obtaining [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to obtain 
CC units in such a way that it motivates them to participate] 
In S3, the main motivation is as in the S2 design, the willingness to comply with what is 
requested by public authorities (limiting energy consumption at the level determined by the 
energy target). However, households which have not performed actions to reduce their 
consumption yet have an extra motivation to do so in S3, since a list of those actions allows 
them to obtain-earn extra CC units. Obtaining CC units is thus mainly related to energy 
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targets, as in S2 but, on top of that, complementary actions are rewarded, as is the case in 
the S1 design.  
Using [This parameter describes the rationale to build the rules for households to use the 
CC units they have obtained in such a way that it motivates them to participate] 
In S3, the central way to use CC units is linked to household energy consumption, as in S2. 
However S3, just like S1, provides extra ways to use the CC units. The convertibility rates 
are a key instrument to differentiate the ways to use the CC units. 
The Rules - Operation 
Obtaining - Earning [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to earn CC units] 
S3 is a hybrid system with, at its core, a system of energy targets identical to the one 
described in S2. However, the list of actions such as described in S1 also allows households 
to earn extra CC units.  
Obtaining – Buying [Describes the rules vis-à-vis households on how to buy CC units] 
As in S2, the only case in which this is foreseen is when a participant has used all his CC 
units (the allotted CC units and those earned through the obtaining-earning list), and has the 
obligation to buy extra CC units from public authorities. However, in the S3 design, 
households have complementary ways of obtaining-earning CC units (list of actions) which 
they might favour over paying a form of penalty. 
Using [Describes the mechanisms put in place to allow the circulation of the obtained CC 
units between participants to the system] 
As described in S2, but CC units can also be used for items on a using list similar to the one 
described in S1. 
Using – Exiting [Describes the mechanisms put in place for the use of CC-units that 
involves their exiting of the system] 
S3 has the same main functioning as S2 (CC units are “consumed” and thus “exit” the 
system in parallel with the effective energy consumption of the households). However, for 
those households which have consumed less energy than their targets, the using list offers 
complementary possibilities to use their CC units before they exit the system. As an exit 
gate, a convertibility-selling rate is foreseen, but at a discounted value. 
The Rules - Currency 
Form [Describes the vehicle chosen for circulation of the CC units] 
As in S1 and S2. 
Value [Describes the unit of account chosen for the CC as well as the standard(s) in relation 
to which the CC-units are evaluated] 
As in S2 plus value for items on the obtaining-earning list and the using list as in S1.  
Informal value [This parameter is used when it is not a formal relation but rather an informal 
relation to a given standard that is used to evaluate the CC-units] 
As in S1 
Lifetime [This parameter describes the validity period of the CC unit] 
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As in S2. 
Convertibility – Buying [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for buying CC 
units] 
As in S2, for households which have to buy extra CC units from public authorities. They have 
the choice of either: 
- Paying a 110% of the convertibility-exchanging value and use their CC units for 
paying their penalty for being above target. 
- Paying a 120% of the convertibility-exchanging value and keep those CC units in a 
fund for investing within a given period of time (e.g. 3 years) in the list of investments 
foreseen (see S2)  
Convertibility – Exchanging [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for 
exchanging CC units] 
As is the case in S1, a convertibility rate is foreseen for partners that have accepted CC units 
as means of payment, and exchange those CC units back against Euros. This convertibility 
rate is used as the baseline (100%) for other convertibility rates (buying and selling) 
Convertibility – Selling [This parameter defines a formal convertibility rate for selling CC 
units] 
In the case of S3 as in S2, a conversion rate from CC units to Euros is foreseen for 
households in excess of CC units, but with a discount (e.g. 50% of the convertibility-
exchanging value). 
Demurrage - Interest [This parameter indicates whether the CC unit is losing (demurrage) 
or gaining (interest) value with time] 
Not foreseen 
Strengths and weaknesses – S3 
Strengths 
- Every household has to participate in the system.  
- The system does not over-reward the households which have done the least efforts 
yet (as was the case in S1). Households that are high above the energy targets when 
the system is put in place are, however, are not over-penalised either (as in S2) since 
they have the possibility to gradually adapt using the “obtaining-earning” mechanism 
of the system. 
- Targets can still be set for energy consumption, even if the rewarding part of the 
system diminished their accuracy. 
- The system offers a wider use for CC units in excess. 
- Households who are lacking CC units are encouraged to invest in energy efficiency 
- The system requires subsidies for the rewarding part; however, the penalty foreseen 
could still bring it near to financial equilibrium. 
Weaknesses 
- The system is more complicated to understand. 
- Social acceptability is key 
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- The S3 architecture still has some of the problems inherent to a regulatory 
architecture (e.g. perceived fairness, sensible parameters: targets, penalty, etc.). 
Further considerations 
Tenant / Owner issue 
S3 architecture is particularly relevant for owners who have the possibility to do some energy 
efficient investments when needed. However, since the PEB of the rented housing is 
becoming mandatory, this could be used as a corrective factor for tenants. It is 
recommended to seek further mechanisms to promote investments from owners in rented 
housing. However, the behavioural part of the system is equally valid for tenants and owners. 
Links to other projects 
It is recommended to link this project with other existing CC systems with sustainability aims 
by creating “exchange rates” for using the CC units in excess. This would be a way to create 
a more unified network of CC systems (which would make more sense to users) and would 
also create a new sink for INESPO CC units. 
2.3.5. System design: Technical aspects 
Use cases 
Consumer centric use cases 
These use cases can be performed through any of the interfaces provided (web site, in-home 
display, shop-terminal, …). 
Consumer account view 
- The consumer logs in to the INESPO BO (e.g. using in-home display or web 
browser). 
- The system authenticates the consumer. 
- The system looks up and summarizes the account status (statistics) in the database. 
Optionally, a benchmark is calculated (to position the consumer‟s behaviour within his 
classification group). 
- The system displays account information, such as current CC status and predicted 
status. 
Consumer buys additional CCs 
This use case is only applicable to a S2 (regulatory) or S3 (hybrid) a system for the obligation 
of buying extra CC units when a household has consumed more energy than its target. 
Besides, the specific case of a market-based WC system is also taken into consideration 
In the case of a S2 or S3 system: 
- The consumer logs in to the INESPO BO 
- The system authenticates the consumer 
- The consumer specifies the amount of CCs he has to buy 
- The system looks up sources for the CCs (in the case of S2 and S3 this is from public 
authorities) 
- The system verifies payment. 
- The system transfers CCs from the source to the consumer‟s account and 
compensates the source. 
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In the case of a market-based WC system 
After the four initial steps described in Consumer account view: 
- The consumer logs in to the INESPO BO 
- The system authenticates the consumer 
- The consumer specifies the amount of CCs he wants to buy, or the price he is willing 
to pay, or who he is willing to buy CCs from. 
- The system looks up sources for the CCs (in a CC market system this would be from 
other consumers that are selling their spare CCs) in the account and market 
database. 
- The system displays the possible sources and price. Step 3 and 4 can be repeated. 
- The system verifies payment. 
- The system transfers CCs from the source(s) to the consumer‟s account and 
compensates the source(s). 
Consumer sells spare CCs 
In the three system designs, a convertibility-selling rate is foreseen for households which 
want to sell their CC units. In the case of a market-based WC system, the same mechanism 
will apply 
- The consumer logs in to the INESPO BO 
- The system authenticates the consumer 
- The consumer specifies the amount of CCs he is willing to sell and optionally 
specifies a minimum price.  
- The system registers the intention and puts a hold on the consumer‟s CCs being sold. 
This prevents consuming CCs that are being sold. 
Consumer uses CCs 
This use case will be typically performed inside a shop (redeeming for real objects), or with 
an installer (double glazing, insulation, etc.).  
- The consumer asks the shop owner/installer to pay using his CCs. 
- Using the shop/installer terminal, the owner requests the INESPO BO to process 
payment. 
- The system verifies both the shop owner‟s/installer‟s and the consumer‟s account 
status and transfers the appropriate number of CCs. 
- The system notifies the shop owner/installer that payment has completed. 
Back-office use cases 
Authenticate user 
The system identifies the user based on predefined credentials. Access to certain options (is 
the user allowed to sell CCs, execute payments, etc…) is determined. 
Manage User CCs and quota’s 
Whenever CCs need to be manipulated, this use case will be involved. 
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Verify payment 
The systems checks if CCs that are being bought are paid for (e.g. by internet banking). 
Update CCs 
Periodically, the INESPO BO system will integrate new meter data into the accounts. This 
could be by importing from a DSO‟s MDM or by querying the meters or “energy boxes” 
directly. Based on this data and baseline information, CCs will be assigned (or removed) 
from consumers. 
Manage database 
Adding/updating new measurement data that arrives from “energy boxes”. 
Retrieve user statistics 
User statistics can be of quantitative or qualitative nature (total consumption this month, 
benchmarks against other consumers or groups, …) and are updated or generated on 
request. 
Other use cases 
Shop owner: Collect payment 
This use case is already incorporated in Consumer uses CCs. 
Energy box: Send measurement data 
The “energy box” mentioned earlier can monitor the households‟ meter directly (thus 
sidestepping the DSO‟s MDM completely) and upload data frequently to the INESPO BO. 
Architecture outlines 
Base scenario 
In the base scenario, neither the metering infrastructure nor the meter itself can be accessed 
directly by the INESPO system, meaning that the DSO (Distribution System Operator, such 
as Eandis) will be the middle-man to access meter readings or settings. This will most likely 
severely limit the minimum time interval between successive readings and make it 
impossible to adapt the meter (software) to specific INESPO needs. Meter data is very much 
a single-way affair (meter to MDM to INESPO). 
However, it may still be possible to read out the meter from inside the premises themselves 
(using an auxiliary port on the meter) so that e.g. an in-home display or terminal can still be 
used. 
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Advanced scenario 
In the advanced scenario, smart meters can be extended to incorporate INESPO specific 
functions. Meters can be directly read out by the INESPO BO server (but most likely still 
through a gateway of the DSO), instead of receiving data through the MDM. This will improve 
the CC calculation flow. Thus, communication with the meters is fully two-directional. 
 
Figure 12 INESPO advanced smart meter architecture outline 
Database system 
Based on the derived use cases, it is possible to derive a “first approximation” of the 
underlying database of the INESPO back-office. 
Figure 11 INESPO standard smart meter architecture outline 
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Using only a basic set of attributes, an UML use case diagram has been designed. Additional 
attributes will be necessary in an implementation but are omitted in this approximation. 
 
Figure 13 Back-office database class diagram 
The UML classes are then used to draw a relational schema of the resulting tables and keys 
(with the exception of the account statistics table). 
Implications & issues 
As the proposed systems are very much a one-way affair, one of the main issues is 
scalability. In a scalable architecture, resource usage should increase linearly (or better) with 
load, where load is measured in user traffic, data volume, etc. 
A good illustration is the French DSO ERDF. If it were to install smart meters for its 35 million 
connections, reporting a value every 30 minutes would result in about 84GB of 
measurements every day (at only 50 bytes/measurement). This would also generate a lot of 
database queries per second (not only writing values, but also lookup queries, etc…). One or 
more adequately sized dedicated datacentres (cloud based) would be needed to sustain 
such traffic, running a well-designed application. 
Possible bottlenecks 
If a central back-office is used in the INESPO system, the following bottlenecks would require 
special attention: 
- Computation of CCs 
- User statistics 
- Transaction management (buying/selling) 
The front-end can play a major role in the offloading of the back-office because it is in an 
ideal position to act as both a caching and load-balancing system. More on this subject is 
found in the next section on scalability considerations. 
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Scalability considerations 
Because the INESPO architecture potentially has to serve millions of users, scalability is a 
major concern. But just as in any other high availability business application, two methods 
can be used to increase the service capacity: scaling up (adding more resources to a 
system, such as more memory, disks or CPUs) and scaling out (adding more computer 
systems). 
Furthermore, several general design considerations can be taken into account when a more 
concrete implementation is built: 
- Splitting: to make scaling possible, splitting is essential, and typically possible on 
multiple levels: 
- Service-oriented-architecture (SOA) or Functional partitioning 
- Application-level splitting 
- Data partitioning 
- Limiting distributed transactions 
- Asynchronous handling of requests 
- Virtualization: Adding another layer of abstraction to an interface 
- Caching: The goal of a caching system is to keep the most requested data in memory 
so it can be immediately retrieved without taxing any other systems. 
Privacy considerations 
A topic still left untouched in the architecture design is the implications on privacy. Privacy 
can be defined as the right to respect for private life, to secure for the individual a sphere 
within which he can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his personality. 
Considering that smart meters can technically be used to track a household‟s behaviour 
(Labeeuw and Deconinck, 2011) adequate measures must be put in place to avoid abuse. 
Potential interested parties of such meter data include not only malicious hackers but also 
creative marketing departments willing to go the extra step to supply third parties with e.g. 
optimized advertising targets. 
 
2.4. INESPO - Social acceptability 
An important precondition for the successful implementation of energy policies is their social 
acceptability. The reason for this is simple: politicians are reluctant to implement policies 
lacking public support. This reluctance has both to do with the fear of opposing the general 
public as well as with effectiveness considerations. Studying social acceptability also helps in 
identifying elements that could and/or should be improved. 
According to Steg et al. (2006 a) social acceptance of energy policies mainly depends on two 
factors: individual attitudes and preferences on the one hand and features of energy policies 
on the other hand. The individual factors influencing social acceptance have to do with 
people‟s awareness of the need to reduce our energy consumption as well as the extent to 
which people feel responsible and are prepared to assume responsibility for the problems 
our energy intensive lifestyle causes (Steg et al., 2006 b). The policy features influencing 
social acceptability are diverse. First, public support for a policy correlates positively with its 
perceived fairness (Jagers et al. 2010). Fairness may have several dimensions, but in this 
context the distributional impact is considered particularly important. 
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Second, acceptability of a policy is higher when it is likely to be effective in reaching its 
objectives. Third, policies that do not impact people‟s freedom of choice are also more 
acceptable. A fourth element is that households find energy savings through energy 
efficiency improvements more acceptable than behavioural changes (Poortinga et al., 2003). 
Fifth, people are more in favour of the use of incentives than disincentives. A final point is 
that also the way incentives are financed or revenues from disincentives are used matters. 
Disincentives are deemed more acceptable if the revenues they generate are allocated 
within the same domain rather than to the general funds of the government. Likewise are 
incentives considered to be more acceptable when they are financed from within the energy 
domain rather than from general public funds. (Steg et al., 2006 a) 
2.4.1. Methodology 
Research methods 
The social acceptability of the innovative instruments for energy saving has been assessed 
by means of five focus groups with five to fifteen participants each lasting about two hours 
and a half. A total of 43 participants attended the focus groups. Each focus group addressed 
a different group of people: greens, people with a low income or social tenants, young 
people, settled people with children and people aged over 55. 
A focus group is a carefully planned, relatively in-depth discussion during which the 
participants can build on each other‟s ideas. The 5 discussions all followed the same format: 
- Warm up and introductions: Introduction to the INESPO project and the objectives of 
the focus group. Participants are informed about the format of the focus group and 
are put at ease. Finally, the rules of game are also explained. 
- Current knowledge about energy use and options for energy savings by households: 
Participants engaged in an exercise in which they inventoried which activities require 
(most) energy at home. Next, they were asked to indicate which options are available 
to them for lowering their energy use. To conclude participants were asked what the 
government is offering households to stimulate energy savings at home. 
- The discussion about every single question was followed by a wrap-up by the 
discussion leader. At the point in the discussion where the options for lowering the 
energy use were being discussed it was explicitly pointed out that there are two broad 
options for saving energy: changing our energy behavior or investing in energy 
efficiency improvements. 
- Willingness to reduce one‟s energy use: This discussion explored the extent to which 
individuals are prepared to take action to lower their domestic energy use. The 
reasons underlying people‟s prepared to save energy were also discussed. 
- Presentation and evaluation of the innovative instruments: The instruments were 
introduced to the participants and spontaneous responses were aired. After that 
specific questions were raised to find out how the participants feel about the systems. 
The smart metering component of the instrument or system was marginally covered during 
the focus group discussions. A literature and document review was carried out to find out 
about the most important acceptability issues pertaining to smart meters. 
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Rationale and limitations of the approach 
A qualitative approach was chosen for this research as it allows exploring people‟s initial 
ideas and views people about the acceptability of the innovative systems for stimulating 
energy savings. A focus group is an ideal tool for facilitating such an initial stocktaking on 
acceptability issues as is allows collecting a wealth of information from different people in an 
interactive, structured and relatively in-depth manner. This technique is deemed very useful 
for testing public support for new measures, or parts thereof, at an early stage. 
Given the approach taken, the findings that are presented on the systems are the views of a 
small number of people. These views were formed over a relatively short period of time and 
on the basis of limited information. It should also be recognised that people may have been 
influenced by the way discussions were structured as well as by the group dynamics. For this 
reason it would be incorrect to refer to the results in terms of minority / majority views or 
percentage figures. The results give an indication of the views held by the people that 
participated in the focus groups and caution should be applied in extrapolating the findings. 
The discussions during the focus groups did not focus on the smart metering component of 
the innovative instruments. The reason for this is twofold. First, the added value of doings so 
would have not been very high given the wealth of information that exists on the acceptability 
of smart metering technology. Second, in order to ensure the quality and the depth of the 
discussions it was decided not to bother the participants with a quite different topic. 
2.4.2. Results 
Observations and views on current energy saving policies and people’s 
preparedness to reduce energy use 
Although not the primary objective of the current research, the discussions during the focus 
groups revealed a number of useful complementary insights. A brief overview of the most 
import issues with respect to people‟s views on current energy saving policies, people‟s 
preparedness to reduce their energy use as well as people‟s ideas on what would be the 
best way forward to make households save energy are provided here. The idea is that these 
issues also matter with respect to the acceptability of the innovative instruments. 
Observations and views on current energy saving policies 
People generally find the current system of energy saving policies, and especially the 
different financial incentives, complex. The problem is that they lack overview of what is 
exactly offered by whom: there is a proliferation of actors and initiatives. Partly because of 
this people also find that initiatives are not well-coordinated and might even give wrong and 
conflicting signals. 
There are a number of issues concerning the financial incentives for promoting energy 
savings. There is a general concern over the tenability of a subsidy based system in the long 
run. Related to this is the fact that people planning to invest in energy saving measures fear 
the fact that financial incentives can suddenly be removed or lowered. Another issue that 
matters to people is the fact that households have to pre-finance their energy saving 
investments. Even more important is the fact that people with no or a low income cannot 
benefit from tax reductions for energy saving investments. 
However a lot is being done already some people find there is still a lack of emphasis on 
promoting the soundness of the structure of the houses from an energetic point of view. 
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People also find that energy bills should be send much faster and more frequently. At the 
moment the link between the energy bill and energy use / behavior is too loose. 
People’s preparedness to reduce their energy use 
The single most important observation is that comfort matters to people. People also prefer 
to save energy through investing in the energy efficiency of their houses rather than by 
changing their behavior. The young people stated it this in the following way „we rather like to 
care about energy at certain moments in time e.g. when buying a house or electrical 
appliances instead of having to adapt our behaviour‟. People aged over 55, however, wonder 
whether investing in the energy efficiency of their houses it is still worth the effort and the 
investment. 
A side condition put forward by some people is that everybody has to assume responsibility 
in accordance with one‟s means. Others, however, expressed their doubts about whether 
individual efforts really can make a difference. Young people admitted they are not losing any 
sleep over limiting their energy use as most of them do not have to pay the energy bill 
themselves. 
What is the best way to make households save energy? 
There is a general agreement that increasing the price of energy would be very effective to 
realise energy savings at the household level. Some participants in the focus group further 
elaborated the idea and suggested there should be a variation in prices depending on the 
amount of energy consumed. 
Getting prices right is not the only issue. The provision of „more and better information‟ was 
also highlighted as a working point. Information should be correct, consistent and 
trustworthy; accessible; provided at the right time as well as at the right place; and, targeted 
(simple enough, etc.). People need to know what they can best do in their situation; they 
want to know what a good investment is and what not. Some participants suggested making 
courses in energy conscious behaviour compulsory. 
Others suggested that the government should make sure that all electrical appliances on the 
market – and by extension also investment goods like houses – are very energy efficient so 
people do not need to worry about this when purchasing. Younger people noted the 
introduction of a sort of competition element in order to stimulate people to save energy. 
Insights on the social acceptability of the innovative instruments 
In general, many participants in the focus groups liked the logic behind the idea of using 
complementary currencies. They themselves see the lack of information on their energy use 
as an obstacle to saving energy and acknowledge smart metering might offer some 
interesting applications. 
Both systems gave reason for concern with respect to the position of tenants and people who 
do not have the monies to invest in energy saving measures.  
Before entering into a selection of comments on the two systems reference is made to a 
number of outstanding issues: 
- How to deal with people working at home, living partly abroad, sharing a collective 
heating system, etc.? 
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- Do these systems replace parts of existing energy policies or to they come on top of 
it? 
- Who will manage the system and determine the different factors? 
- Will the system only cover the use electricity and natural gas? 
While some people find it all right to talk about relatively general principles others rather 
prefer to have all rules fixed and impacts quantified. Especially the latter group of people 
might have found it difficult to talk about the systems as there are still a number of 
outstanding issues and undefined parameters. 
Rewarding system (S1) 
People like the idea of being rewarded for energy friendly behaviour. In general, the 
participants in the focus groups very much liked the logic behind the idea of using 
complementary currencies (INESPOs) as it allows policy makers to realise more energy 
savings with fewer resources.  
People that are retired and/or have a low income liked the idea of having the tax reductions 
for energy saving measures replaced by INESPOs as they cannot reap the benefits of tax 
reductions. 
It was raised in all but one focus group that households that already have a low energy 
consumption cannot fully take advantage of the rewarding system. These households might 
actually loose in this system as they might help to sustain the system financially, but cannot 
themselves reap the benefits of it. A solution put forward for remediating this situation would 
consist of also rewarding households that consistently have a low energy use. The question 
one should ask here is whether the government should spend money on supporting those 
that can hardly lower their energy use even more while there are still many other households 
with more cost effective energy saving options. 
Not everyone can fully take advantages of this system. Both tenants as people that do not 
have the necessary monies to invest might not be able to benefit from the system. 
Regulatory system with quotas (energy target) (S2) 
In various focus group discussions it was raised that this system can potentially be very 
effective in reducing households‟ energy use. This is a reason for some people to prefer the 
regulatory system with quota instead of the rewarding system. While some state the system 
still needs some refinement there is are many people that oppose the system. It is 
questioned whether people are ready for such a system. The concerns about the readiness 
of the people for this kind of system especially concerns the short and medium term. When 
announced in time and backed by sufficient transitional measures the core of the system is 
generally seen as valuable in the long run. 
The reasons why people are not fond of the system are manifold. The complexity, as well as 
the administrative burden the system may generate, of the system has been cited in almost 
all focus group discussion as an issue of concern. Particularly people aged over 55 and 
people with a low income see the complexity of the system as problematic. It is said that 
people will oppose this regulatory system because they simply find it too difficult to 
understand it. Especially the definition of the household specific baselines is deemed to be 
too complex as it depends on a – still undefined – function encompassing various 
parameters. 
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It is not only the complexity that matters, but also the perceived fairness of the system. 
People doubt whether the quota or energy targets can really be allocated in a fair way. Both 
the complexity and fairness of the system renders the participants in the focus groups quite 
sceptical about the acceptability of the system as they tend to believe it will be impossible to 
arrive at a system that is considered fair by everybody. 
Next to the perceived fairness it is a fact that those people that are not able to invest in the 
energy efficiency of their homes might find themselves trapped by the system. These 
households will find themselves worse of year after year when the targets are becoming 
stricter. The solution is that either the system is adapted to account for the situation of these 
people or complementary mechanisms are set up to address this kind of situations. 
Some people have problems with the regulatory system as it might be perceived as a sort of 
hidden taxation. 
Another drawback of the regulatory system is that it will be possible for people to escape 
from this „mandatory‟ system. Households that are using electricity and natural gas for 
heating their house could switch to heating oil, pellets, coal, etc. which are not included in the 
system. The idea is that the system will simply not work because of this. It was also 
highlighted that this might even lead to a situation that is inferior in terms of energy efficiency 
and the overall environmental impact. 
The management of this system is also challenged by specific realities. The focus group 
discussion with the group of people with a low income revealed that social tenants change 
homes very often. It is e.g. not uncommon for those people to move up to 3 or 4 times year. 
Complementary insights from the online survey 
As the social acceptability of the systems is correlated with their effectiveness we can also 
refer to the insights of the evaluation of the INESPO architecture, and more specifically the 
online questionnaire that has been carried out. The questionnaire enquired households about 
their opinion on various characteristics – among which the energy saving potential – of both 
the rewarding and the regulatory system. 
Not surprisingly, the majority (73.33) of the respondents prefer the rewarding system. 
However, about a quarter of the respondents are rather in favour of the regulatory system, 
which can be considered as a relatively high score for this type of system.  
It is very likely that this preference reflects in the fact that the majority (59.44%) of the 
respondents to the questionnaire believe that the rewarding system will generate more 
energy savings than the regulatory system (17.22%). It should also be noted that nearly one 
fifth (18.89%) of the respondents doubt whether the systems can really reduce household 
energy consumption. With respect to the rewarding system households believe that 
rewarding investments in energy savings is slightly more effective than rewarding 
behavioural change. Critical for the effectiveness of both systems is the fact whether 
households will exit the systems or not. The answers to the questionnaire indicate that the 
incentives in the rewarding system and the disincentives in the regulatory system might have 
the desired effect, which is critical for the effectiveness of both systems to generate energy 
savings. 
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Use of smart meters 
With respect to the use of smart meters a number of different issues are touched upon: 
people‟s knowledge about smart meters; idea‟s on the energy saving potential of smart 
meters; people‟s preference for the kind of information provided as well as the information 
channel used; people‟s ideas about privacy considerations, the introduction of tariff periods, 
and the acceptability of cutting of electricity at peak periods. 
Knowledge 
The knowledge about smart meters among the households is low. Only a quarter of the 
respondents to the VREG (2011) questionnaire stated that they know what a smart meter is. 
People with a higher education level are better informed about smart meters. During the 
focus group discussions no one could explain the principle of a smart meter. 
Usefulness and energy saving potential 
The VREG (2008) questionnaire asked people whether they would be able to save energy 
when they would receive more information on their energy consumption (not specifying what 
this information would be like). Slightly over three-quarter of the households thought they 
would be able to save electricity with this additional information, while a little less than two 
third of the households consuming natural gas judged they can make savings on their gas 
consumption. 
After having received a brief introduction about smart maters two thirds of the respondents to 
the VREG (2011) questionnaire believe that a smart meter can be helpful in reducing their 
energy use. People aged below 55 as well as tenants are most convinced of the usefulness 
of smart meters. A quite striking observation is that those people with prior knowledge about 
smart meters are more sceptical with respect to the energy saving potential of smart meters. 
Within the group of people that believes the use of smart meters might be useful for saving 
electricity 10% of the people state the use of smart meters could save them up to 7%, 36% 
beliefs savings between 2 and 5% are feasible, while 32% even thinks to save between 5 
and 10% and 9% believes that savings of more than 10% can be realised (VREG, 2011). 
The expected energy saving potential of smart meters for gas consumption are quite similar: 
11% expects to save up to 2%, 36% between 2 and 5%, 21% between 5 and 10% and 12% 
of the people think savings over 10% will be achieved VREG (2010). 
Young people and people with small children are generally more optimistic about the energy 
saving potential of smart meters (VREG, 2010 and 2011) 
Provision of information on actual energy use 
The VREG (2011) questionnaire revealed that the most popular channels for receiving 
feedback on one‟s energy use is via the internet (57%), as an annex to the invoice (57%) or 
via the smart meter (44%). A bit more than a quarter of all respondents would like to receive 
the information via a separate screen on a well-accessible place. 
The younger the people the more they like to receive the information via the internet. The 
same is true for high skilled people. People aged over 55 prefer an annex to their invoice. 
Also low skilled persons prefer to receive information on paper or via the mobile phone. 
(VREG, 2011) 
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The results of the VREG (2010) questionnaire reveal that nearly two third of the respondents 
likes to receive the feedback in euro‟s and not in kWh. From the remainder about two third 
would like to get feedback in euro and one third both in euro and kWh. People that have a 
higher education and/or earn more generally have a higher preference for receiving feedback 
in kWh. 
Households are mostly interested in comparing their year to year energy consumption. Less 
than half the households want to be able to compare their energy use to comparable 
families. Younger people are generally more interested in benchmarking their energy use 
with families of a comparable size. (VREG, 2010) 
Privacy 
The VREG (2010) questionnaire revealed that most households (86%) have no problems 
with the fact that smart meters allow energy companies to track their energy consumption at 
quasi every moment of the day. People aged over 55 are slightly more concerned about their 
privacy than younger families. People with the lowest and the highest education are 
generally more concerned about privacy related issues.  
Tariff periods 
Smart meter technology allows working with tariff periods. This means that electricity will be 
cheaper / more expensive at certain parts of the day. Two third of the households stated in 
the VREG (2011) questionnaire that they would adapt their electricity consumption in order 
take advantage of the lower electricity tariffs at certain parts of the day. Younger people are 
much more open of tariff periods than people aged over 55. Also tenants are clearly more in 
favour of tariff periods than owners. 
A bit less than half of the respondents states they might want to buy smart appliances, which 
can automatically be activated when tariffs are low, after smart meters have been installed. 
One third is not interested in smart appliance and about 17% even considers buying smart 
appliances in the near future. People aged over 55 are less interested in buying smart 
appliances than younger people. (VREG, 2011) 
Cut of electricity at peak periods 
About 55% of the respondents are against limiting electricity use at peak periods in exchange 
for a compensation. Tenants are generally less opposed to the idea than owners. People 
with the highest incomes are significantly more opposed to the idea. Those respondents that 
find smart meter technology useful are relatively more open to temporary limits in the 
electricity provision than others. (VREG, 2011) 
 
2.5. INESPO - Architecture evaluation 
The previous sections provide first insights on the social acceptability of two of the designed 
systems (S1 and S2). But other aspects have to be investigated for those systems as well: 
on the one hand, the potential energy savings, green shifts and CO2 savings such new 
instruments could bring and, on the other hand, some elements about their economic 
aspects.  
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Obviously, as INESPO is a pioneering project of theoretical elaboration and design of the 
systems, it is impossible to come up with accurate quantitative figures for any of the here 
above mentioned points. Further experiments, trials and pilot projects based on the designed 
systems are needed to assess the potential and costs of those innovative instruments. 
Besides, the expected results would still be subject to changes, depending on the political 
will to implement those instruments, and the many governance decisions that need to be 
taken.  
However, the object of the next sections is to come up with first qualitative evaluations on the 
one hand of the energy saving potential of the designed rewarding and regulatory systems 
and, on the other hand, of economic aspects. The potential of these systems to promote a 
green shift (i.e. an increase in the consumption of renewable energy as compared to the use 
of „grey energy‟ from fossil fuel fired or nuclear power plants) is also touched upon. The point 
of analysis is, again, the household level. 
2.5.1. Energy savings, green shifts and CO2 savings 
Research method 
The methodology to carry out this task is resting on a three-step process: 
- the identification of parameters that enable to differentiate between S1and S2  
- the building of a questionnaire on this basis for an online survey (specific groups of 
respondents) 
- the building of a model for S1 and S2 
Since the results of modelling S1 and S2 for energy and CO2 savings are also used for the 
economic evaluating, the last step of modelling is explained in a separate section, page 81. 
Identification of differentiating parameters 
The parameters shown in Figure 14 are differentiating S1 and S2 regarding the potential 
energy and CO2 savings that could be achieved. An important parameter which is outside 
the boundaries of the system designs is the number of smart meters installed. S1 promotes 
specifically investments in energy efficiency (although a limited number of them, as defined 
in the obtaining and using lists). S2 only promotes investments indirectly via the energy 
targets and the possibility to use the INESPO fund. Both systems are built to promote energy 
savings obtained through behavioural change, but S1 is working with relative changes in 
consumption and S2 with absolute energy consumption targets. The timeframe is also 
different, since targets in S2 are set for a well-defined period (1 year in this design). 
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 S1 S2 
Participation Voluntary Regulatory 
Roll-out Open (participants equipped) Minimum required 80% 
Investments in EE Specific rewards 
Obtaining list (for a limited 
number of investments) 
Using list (for a limited number 
of investments) 
No specification on investments 
Possibility to use the INESPO 
fund to recover Euro for 
investments 
Behav. change Δ consumption Energy targets 
Time frame Open 1 year 
Figure 14: S1-S2 differentiating parameters 
The online survey 
An online questionnaire has been developed and then carried out to enquire households 
about their opinion on various characteristics – among which the energy saving potential – of 
both the rewarding and the regulatory system. In total, 180 completed questionnaires have 
been received. In order to receive feedback on the systems from a broad spectrum of 
households – as in the focus groups that were organised for assessing the social 
acceptability of the systems – specific groups of people were addressed: greens, people with 
a low income or social tenants, young people, settled people with children and people aged 
over 55. 
For clarity reasons, only the principles of S1 and S2 were exposed in a few lines on the 
questionnaire, without mentioning concepts like complementary currencies or smart metering 
for instance. For the same reason, the hybrid system (S3) was not presented in the 
questionnaire. 
In order to try to avoid strategic answers, the questionnaire not only enquired households 
about the energy saving potential of the key characteristics of both systems, but also about 
their own preferences for specific features of these systems. 
The insights gathered through the questionnaire are also combined with insights from the 
social acceptability analysis, as the effectiveness of measures of the systems is correlated 
with their acceptability. The questionnaire consists of a number of key questions about the 
system, a control question and a number of questions about the socio-economic background 
of the respondents. 
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The questionnaire 
Key questions about the system relate to: 
1. preferences for either a rewarding or a regulatory (energy target based) 
system; 
2. appreciation of the likely effectiveness of either a rewarding or an energy 
target based system; 
3. preferences for either changing behaviour or making energy saving 
investments; 
4. appreciation of the likely effectiveness of changing behaviour or making 
energy saving investments; 
5. preference for the different options on both the obtaining-earning and using 
lists; 
6. likely reaction when they are confronted with a situation in which their 
allocated energy target turns out to be too limited compared to their regular 
energy use; 
7. appreciation of the different options on the using list versus the possibility to 
exchange INESPOs for Euros. 
Rationale and limitations of the approach 
The method chosen allows exploring the energy saving potential of the designed systems as 
well as the potential of these systems to promote a green shift. Although 180 people 
completed the online questionnaire the findings are not representative. Most respondents to 
the questionnaire are male (61%). The age of the respondents varies, but older age groups 
tend to be overrepresented (11% up to 29 years old; 16% between 30 and 39 years old; 25% 
between 40 and 54 years old; 21% between 55 and 64 years old; 27% of 65 and older). Most 
respondents (89%) own the house or apartment they live in, which is higher than average. 
The monthly disposable household income of the respondents follow the following 
distribution: 2% up to 999 euro; 25% between 1000 and 1999 euro; 35% between 2000 and 
2999 euro; 25% between 3000 and 3999 euro; 13% dispose of 4000 euro or more. Most 
respondents stated they are (relatively) economical with energy (15% very economical; 32% 
economical; relatively economical 48%; not economical 5%). To conclude, we like to refer to 
the fact that a relatively large number of people think the energy efficiency of their dwellings 
can either not be improved (13%) or only very little (25%).  
Also, the answers to the questionnaire do not provide evidence of households‟ behaviour, but 
only a statement by household representatives. Moreover, the respondents have not been 
introduced to the entire systems, but only to their basic characteristics. 
Some results are presented in terms of minority/majority views or percentage figures. 
However, for the reasons mentioned above, caution should be applied in extrapolating the 
findings. 
A few times reference is made to the results from the focus groups. As the collection of ideas 
on the basis of focus groups is a purely qualitative approach, the resulting insights can only 
be used as exploratory. 
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Results from the online survey 
As could be expected, the results of Q1 show a marked preference (73.33%) for the 
rewarding system (S1), although the regulatory-target based system (S2) reaches a 
surprisingly high score (23.33%) considering its mandatory – tax-like rationale. Only a limited 
number of respondents (3.33%) had no clear answer on the matter.  
Q2 covers the appreciation of the respondent on which system could help public authorities 
reaching the greatest energy savings for the household sector. Even if a vast majority of 
respondents‟ answers (76.66%) indicate they believe those systems will promote energy 
savings, still 18.89% of the respondents are doubtful about the fact that either system will 
have a significant impact on households energy consumption. This tends to indicate that 
respondents are aware of the difficulty of behavioural change.  
Amongst those who believe the systems have an impact, the relative percentages between 
tenants of a rewarding (3/4) and a target-based system (1/4) are more or less maintained. 
The fact that the majority of the respondents thinks the rewarding system has the greatest 
potential to realise energy savings is somewhat surprising as, in general, evidence suggests 
that regulatory (obligatory) systems are more effective than rewarding (voluntary) systems, 
because of higher participation rates. Evidence is supported by the discussions during the 
focus groups which indicated that the regulatory system can potentially be very effective in 
reducing households‟ energy use. However, the discussions during the focus groups also 
raised questions about the acceptability of such a regulatory system which could negatively 
impact the answer related to its perceived effectiveness.  
The rewarding system (S1) 
With respect to the rewarding system, most households (52%) think that rewarding the 
investment in energy savings is likely to generate most energy savings, while a smaller 
percentage of the participating households (43%) believe rewarding energy savings is the 
more effective strategy. Irrespective of the kind of action/behaviour that is rewarded, a critical 
issue with respect to the effectiveness of the system is what households actually do with the 
reward, which is a number of INESPO CC units, they obtain. Do households chose to use 
this reward for (co-)financing investments in energy savings, energy courses, paying their 
green electricity bills, etc., or will they exchange the INESPOs they obtained for Euros and 
thus opt out of the system? A large majority of the households that participated in the 
questionnaire (84%) indicated they would use the reward to (co-)finance investments in 
energy savings, energy courses, paying their green electricity bills, etc. About one tenth of 
the responding households indicated they would either do nothing with the reward they 
receive (1%) or exit the system and exchange their reward for Euro(s) (9%). The answers to 
this question indicate that the rewarding system might be effective as the majority of the 
people choose to use the INESPOs they receive. 
The regulatory system (S2) 
With respect to the regulatory system, it is key to know that households can consume more 
energy than the target that is attributed to them. Households that consume more than their 
target, however, have to pay extra for each unit of energy they consume more. Being asked 
what they will do when they are informed that they are about to consume more than their 
target, and that beyond this point each unit of energy will cost more, households stated they 
will do the following: both invest within one year in energy savings and immediately adapt 
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their energy behaviour (41%), immediately adapt their energy behaviour (40%), invest within 
one year in energy savings (3%), invest later on in energy savings (5%), nothing and thus 
pay extra for each unit of energy they consume more than their target (7%). The answers to 
this question illustrate that households believe the regulatory system will mostly impact their 
energy behaviour, as well as to a much lower degree, their investment decisions. As only a 
minority of the people indicate they will not do anything to lower their energy use the system 
might be potentially effective. 
Green shifts 
On the basis of the questionnaire it is only possible to extend on the potential of the 
rewarding system to promote a green shift. In the rewarding system households can obtain a 
number of INESPOs as a reward, which they can use for (co-)financing investments in 
energy savings or expenditures that promote a green shift. The latter expenditures can be 
the payment of green electricity bills as well as the purchase of installations for the 
generation of green electricity (like photovoltaic installations or heat pumps) and hot water 
(solar boiler). Households were asked what they would use their INESPOs CC units for. 
About one third of the households that responded to the questionnaire opted of an option that 
would support a green shift (payment of green electricity bills (13%), installation of 
photovoltaic panels (7%) and installation of a solar boiler (10%) rather than for energy saving 
investments.  
With respect to the regulatory system it can be stated that this system is primarily designed 
to generate energy savings. The system does not provide any specific incentive to switch 
from the use of „grey energy‟ to the use of energy from green or renewable sources. 
Limitations of the results 
As stated before, what households state they think they will do still does not provide 
evidence of their actual behaviour. The results should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Probably, much depends on the strength of the incentive (value of the reward in the 
rewarding system) or disincentive (extra cost of a unit of energy for a household that is above 
target as well as the level of ambition of the target in the regulatory system). Also, the energy 
saving potential of the systems considered will depend on a number of critical issues that 
have been identified during the focus group discussions. What information and assistance 
will be provided to the households with respect to their energy use? Will it be possible to 
escape from the system or not? Will there be a board that supervises the system and has the 
capacity to manage the system and adapt the different parameters in order to increase the 
effectiveness of the system?  
2.5.2. Economic evaluation 
In order to provide elements on the economic evaluation of S1 and S2, the methodology 
includes a first step dedicated to the setting up of the systems, and a second step which 
uses the modelling of S1 and S2: 
- setting up of S1 and S2: research of differentiating parameters and elements of costs 
- running costs of S1 and S2 (maintenance and specific costs) 
- modelling S1 and S2 (jointly with energy and CO2 savings in page 81) 
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Elements of cost (including differentiating parameters) 
In this part, an initial and general estimate of costs is presented relative to the 
implementation of the INESPO scheme.  
Figure 15 below shows the number of households considered in the cost calculation: 
 
Figure 15: Number of households considered in the cost calculation 
The project related costs are divided into several parts. Each part is further detailed below. 
Some costs only apply to specific implementations of the INESPO system (differentiating 
parameters), which are marked as such. 
- Smart meters 
- Back-office 
- Front-end 
- Daily management 
- Set-up & maintenance of S2 household profiles 
- Calculating INESPO‟s 
- Validation & anti-fraud 
- Privacy measures 
- Set-up of terminals & kiosks 
Smart meters 
In 2008, KEMA made a report for the VREG on the cost-benefits of a smart meter rollout in 
Flanders. While INESPO merely makes use of a smart meter infrastructure, it is interesting to 
have an estimate of the total costs involved in such an operation (see Figure 16). The results 
have been extrapolated to the whole of Belgium based on the number of households. 
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Figure 16: Total costs involved in deploying smart meters 
The initial set up of the back-office is a crucial task. Apart from buying and setting up server 
hardware, a database framework will have to be created and its initial structures filled. This 
has to be right from the start; fundamentally changing it during prime time could be very 
costly. In both the voluntary and the regulatory system, data from the social security service 
and suppliers will need to be inserted and updated on a regular basis (see Figure 17). 
Additionally, a validated and secure market-backend has to be created where the INESPO 
credits can be traded or bought through payment systems (variant of S2 with “white 
certificate” tradable market). 
We expect this task to take about 220 man-months. Maintenance is taken to be 20% of total 
initial cost. 
 
Figure 17: Set-up and maintenance costs of back-office 
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Front-end set-up and maintenance 
The front-end is the part that allows direct interaction with end-users and terminals. The 
development includes not only the software but also interaction studies and end-user 
documentation, such as the typical “help” sections (see Figure 18). 
Additionally, maintenance includes adding new features, applying fixes and patches and 
basically ensuring the front-end stays operational. 
 
Figure 18: Set-up and maintenance costs of front-end 
 
Daily management 
For a contact point to ask question, report problems or complaints, a continuously operating 
team is required (see Figure 19). They should be able to quickly intervene and assist in day-
to-day affairs. About 5 FTE seems sufficient for this task. Cost of location is not included. 
 
Figure 19: Daily operational management costs 
 
Household profiles set-up and maintenance (S2 only) 
For S2, initially a set of rules will be applied to the database information on the households 
participating in INESPO to divide them into the necessary consumption profiles (see Figure 
20). For most households, the data imported in the INESPO database will be sufficient to 
reliably classify them. There will still be a number of cases that need manual intervention, 
which costs time and thus a lot more money.  
 
 
Figure 20: Profile-related costs (S2) 
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Calculating INESPO’s 
 
Figure 21: Costs for calculating INESPOs 
Security  
 
 
Figure 22: Security related costs 
Terminals and kiosks set-up (S1 only) 
 
Figure 23: Terminal related costs 
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2.5.3. Modelling S1 and S2 
In the following section, the modelling of S1 and S2 is presented. This modelling is aiming at 
providing first qualitative evaluations of the two system designs regarding their potential in 
terms of energy and CO2 savings, as well as in terms of economic evaluation. It is based on 
a model developed by Klopfert and Joachain, 2012c.  
Modelling S1 and S2 is resting on hypothesis regarding external data which are used for both 
systems (Figure 24). In the model, it is considered that heating comes from gas with an 
average consumption per household of 25,000 kWh per year. This is a limitation of this 
model as it supposes that other heating methods (fioul, biomass) can also be monitored 
through SM-type or related methods which is not the case for the moment. 
 
Figure 24: External data 
If further quantitative research were to be drawn from those models, this would imply, in the 
first place, to validate the hypothesis and figures adopted in the models.  
Figure 25 shows how the participation rates vary in S1 and S2 in function of the reward rate 
for S1 and the penalty rate for S2 according to the hypotheses of the model. 
 
Figure 25: Participation rates for various rewarding (S1) and penalty (S2) rates 
Hypothesis
Number of households in Belgium 4,612,914
Average electricity consuption 3,500 kWh élec
Average gaz consuption 25,000 kWh gas
Electricity to primary energy factor 2.5
Gas to primary energy factor 1.1
CO2 saving per kWh elec 456.0 gr / kWh
CO2 saving per kWh gas 251.0 gr / kWh
End-user price electricity 0.17 € / kWh
End-user price gas 0.05 € / kWh
Installed SM at INESPO roll-out 80%
Installation rate of SM 5%
Value of CO2 10 € / ton
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Results of modelling S1 
A summary of the result obtained by this modelling of S1 for households is provided in Figure 
26. 
The costs for the public authorities are estimated based on the costs for the INESPO S1 
system (set-up, maintenance and cost per household for rewarding system). On top of those 
costs are the costs of rewarding households. The benefits from CO2 savings are attributed to 
public authorities. 
 
Figure 26: Evaluation of costs and savings of S1 system 
Results of modelling S2 
For the modelling of S2, all calculation are computed on yearly costs taking into account an 
amortisation period. This implies that financial barriers and cash-flows problems are not 
taken into account in this model. 
A summary of the result obtained by this modelling of S2 for households is provided in  
Figure 27. 
The costs for the public authorities are estimated based on the costs for the INESPO S2 
system (set-up, maintenance and cost per household for regulatory system). The 10% tax on 
the penalties as well as the benefits from CO2 savings are attributed to public authorities. 
S1 System
Parameters
SM Deployment 80%
Rewarding budget rate 10%
Saving factor relative to reference 100%
Reference electricity savings 1.25% see Impact S1
Reference gas savings 6.39% see Impact S1
Summary
Electricity saving 1.19% 12.30 GWh
Gas saving 6.07% 448 GWh
Primary energy savings 523 GWh
CO2 savings 0.12 Mt
Cost of system for government (€/year) 4,668,477 €
Costs for participating households 15,278,065 €
Total costs of the system 19,946,541 €
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Figure 27: Evaluation of costs and savings of S2 system 
Conclusions: 
Participation and energy savings  
The participation rate is a crucial parameter of the model. In the first place, it impacts 
dramatically the estimation of the total energy and CO2 savings that can be delivered by S1 
and S2 respectively. 
In the model, the participation rate (P) is a function of respectively: 
- S1: Participation =f(reward rate)  
- S2: Participation =f(penalty rate) 
The shape and hypothesis chosen for the functions reflects the fact that: 
- Only a limited percentage of the population participate to voluntary systems (S1) 
- Only a limited percentage of the population is not willing to comply with the regulation, 
and this percentage falls when the penalty increases (S2). 
As expected with using a rewarding vs. regulatory architecture, the estimated participation 
rate is much lower for S1 compared to S2. 
It follows that, even if the realisation of the savings (R) per household is slightly higher in S1, 
the total savings generated by S2 in the model is of another order of magnitude (ten times 
higher) than those enabled by S1. This is also shown in the potential CO2 savings which are 
also estimated about ten times higher in S2 than in S1. Those results reflect the fact that 
households actively participating in S1 might be considered as having a higher success 
S2 System
Parameters
SM Deployment 80%
Imputation of SM cost on INESPO 100%
Penalty (Obliged contribution to fund) 0.10 €/kWhp
Penalty rate 50%
Effective penalty 0.05 €/kWhp
Tax on fund 10%
Target factor relative to reference 100%
Target electricity savings 1.25%
Target gas savings 6.39%
Summary
Electricity saving 1.15% 125.3 GWh
Gas saving 5.45% 4,232 GWh
Primary energy savings 4,968 GWh
CO2 savings 1.12 Mt
Cost of system for government (€/year) 11,349,832 €
Costs for participating households -63,732,302 €
Total costs of the system -52,382,470 €
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factor in the realization of their savings; however, this is completely offset at the global level 
of the system by the difference in participating rate (P) between S1 and S2. 
In the model run for S1, the value chosen for the rewarding rate is 10% of the total 
investment budget, which leads to a participation rate (P) of 5%. Those figures, which seem 
realistic for a system based on voluntary participation, can be modified to check the 
implications this has on the global energy savings and costs of S1.  
It is however very unlikely for the participation rate (P) of S1 to come close to the 80% 
participation rate (P) which is estimated for the regulatory system S2. Indeed, according to 
the hypothesis of the model for S1, an extravagant 100% rewarding rate would be necessary 
to reach such a participation rate (P= 80%), which is not realistic and would lead to rocketing 
costs (households / public authorities) of S1. It seems thus not realistic for S1 to be able to 
deliver the same global energy and CO2 savings as S2.  
Figure 28 shows how those costs for S1 rise when trying to achieve higher savings with S1.  
 
Figure 28: Costs and savings of S1 and S2 as a function of the rewarding and penalty rates 
Investments in energy efficiency and behavioural changes 
As the online survey shows (page 73), S1 seems to be promoting more investments in 
energy efficiency and S2 more behavioural changes. Since this involves more investments in 
the case of S1, it results in higher estimated costs for households to achieve energy savings 
in S1 than in S2.  
The potential secondary effects, such as an increase of economic activity are not considered 
in the model. 
The rewarding rate applied in S1 influences the total budget for both households and public 
authorities in opposite ways: the higher this rate is, the best it is for households and 
conversely. In the model for S1 a value of 10% has been given to the rewarding rate, which 
seems a rather generous hypothesis. However, this 10% rewarding rate does not allow 
compensating the higher costs for the households in S1 compared to S2. Indeed, a 50% 
rewarding rate would have to be applied for the costs of the households to be more or less 
equivalent for the two systems. Once again, applying such a rewarding rate is not realistic 
and would very much inflate the budget of public authorities.  
For the system S2, the penalty is a very important parameter which influences both the 
participation rate and the results of the economic evaluation. In the model, a penalty of 0.05 
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€ per kWhp above target is applied. This would be roughly equivalent to the price of a kWh 
gas and means that households which have consumed more energy than their targets would 
have to pay a penalty roughly equivalent to the price of 1 kWh gas per kWh primary energy 
above their target. The average cost of this penalty estimated in the model is 13.34 € per 
household. Of course, it has to be taken into account that only those who fail their target 
would have to pay, which concentrates the penalty on fewer households. However, in S2, 
penalties are kept in an INESPO fund and households can later recuperate part of it provided 
they do investments in energy efficiency. This could thus constitute a sort of forced saving 
fund for those households that consume more than their targets with an important motivation 
to recuperate their euro through investments. The average cost of penalty would then only be 
around 6.65 € per household. This INESPO fund would also strongly reinforce the potential 
of S2 to promote investments in a medium term.  
Free-riding, shifts of consumption and coherence 
It can also be argued that S1 could be used for free-riding by households which planned to 
do the investments anyway. This could be tempered with the using list of S1, if the CC units 
obtained by participating households can only be used for further investments in energy 
efficiency. However, as explained in section 2.3.1, the using list has to be sufficiently 
attractive for households to get on board the system. A trade-off has thus to be made 
between staying in line with the energy saving objectives of the system on the one hand; and 
offering a rewarding system attractive enough for households to participate on the other 
hand. If it becomes possible for households to use their CC units to pay their green electricity 
bills, for instance, this could be a very powerful incentive for households to participate but it 
could also lead to increased free-riding.  
Regarding S2, it can be argued that targets set for households could lead to a risk of energy 
consumption shifts to other sectors (e.g. systematically showering at the sports club, etc.). 
Further research would have to investigate, however, to which extent such a consumption 
shift is conceivable and practicable for households, how many of them would be ready to 
change their practices accordingly and which influence it would have on consumption. 
Another potential risk of S2 is that households switch to other types of energy sources than 
electricity and gas to escape the system (e.g. wood pellets, coal, etc.). The only way to limit 
those shifts is to develop mechanisms to monitor those energy sources as well. 
Regarding the coherence of the actions taken by households to lower their energy 
consumption, it can be argued that the obtaining-earning list in S1 is a generic list which 
does not provide indication to households on what is the most relevant in their specific case. 
This could lead to incoherence in energy saving investment strategies (e.g. replacing boiler 
before isolating the envelope of the building), which can be inefficient in a number of cases.  
In S2, since there is a form of obligation of result, the actions taken might be more tailored to 
the needs of each household.  
Costs / benefits of the S1 and S2 systems for public authorities 
The costs for public authorities cover the setting up and the maintenance of the systems 
themselves as well as the costs / benefits due to running of the systems (reward and 
penalty). 
Regarding the costs related to the setting up and maintenance of the systems, the estimated 
costs on a period of 10 years are much higher for S2 than S1, due to the extra cost in S2 of 
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taking households‟ profiles into account. However, the costs / benefits estimated for the 
running of the system completely offset this trend. Indeed, for S1, even if the costs due to 
setting up and maintenance are considerably lower than in S2, the budget needed for 
rewarding the households brings the global budget in deficit.  
Regarding S2, even if the costs related to the setting up and maintenance are much higher, 
the benefits from the 10% tax rate on penalty nearly brings the system back to an economic 
equilibrium.  
The economic value of the CO2 savings is attributed to public authorities in the model. This 
does not compensate for the costs of S1, which does still depend on public funding. But it 
reinforces Regarding S2 in its economic sustainability. However, the hypothesis of a 100% 
attribution of CO2 savings to public authorities should be refined in further research.  
Figure 28 shows how the total costs of S1 and S2 evolve when the rewarding (for S1) or the 
penalty (for S2) rates increase from 0% to 100%. The graph also shows how the total 
savings increase for S1 and S2 together with increasing rewarding / penalty rates. As 
previously argued, very high rewarding rates (40%-50%) for S1 are necessary before total 
energy savings obtained by S1 come near those of S2. The effect of those very high 
rewarding rates on the costs of S1 for public authorities is also shown in the graph with 
rocketing public budgets. In the model presented for S1, a more realistic rewarding rate of 
10% is adopted, which leads to a total of 327 GWh primary energy savings and a cost for the 
public authorities around 3.5 million euro per year. The cost per participating household 
(taking into account the benefits they have from the rewarding, as well as the economic value 
of their energy savings in electricity and gas) is around 120 € per year. 
In the S1 model, the estimated reference rate for the savings realised by households are 
based on the energy saving potential and the results of the online survey relative to the 
investment proposed in the obtaining-earning list and behavioural change. However, it is 
possible to take those realised energy savings per household as a variable of the system as 
shown in Figure 29. It could indeed be argued that the rewarding system S1 is most 
appealing to the households which have done the least efforts in the past and have high 
energy consumptions. The energy saving rate for those specific households could thus be 
higher than the average 1.19% and 6.07% used in the model for S1. In Figure 29, the x-axis 
shows the multiplying factor for the estimated reference rate of realized savings (saving 
factor). The y-axis shows the increase in costs for public authorities. However, the highest 
values of realised savings are unrealistic, even for those households with the highest 
potential. Besides, costs for public authorities also become prohibitive. 
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Figure 29: Costs and savings of S1 as function of a multiplying factor 
In the S2 model, the penalty rate considered in Figure 28 is comprised between 0% and 
100% of a basic penalty of 0.10 € per kWhp which is equivalent to two times the price of a 
kWh gas. Figure 28 shows how total savings for S2 increase with higher penalties while the 
total benefits of the system for public authorities increase accordingly. This can be seen as a 
new form of tax on energy. In the modelling of S2, a 50% rate was applied which leads to a 
penalty of 0.05€ per kWhp for energy consumption above target. 
Smart meter deployment 
The modelling of S1 and S2 which is presented in the previous paragraphs tends to show 
that S2 is a much more efficient system both regarding energy / CO2 savings and economic 
aspects. This is mostly to be explained by the much higher participation rate that is expected 
in S2 compared to S1. Besides, S2 seems to be promoting behavioural changes more which 
lead to lower costs for households to achieve energy savings. Finally, the penalty applied in 
S2 brings the system to an economic equilibrium.  
As shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29 with total savings and costs are estimated in function of 
the rewarding rate and saving factor, this gap between S1 and S2 is not likely to be 
overcome. However those modelling are based on the hypothesis of 80% smart meter 
deployment prior to INESPO. Although for S1, this hypothesis is not critical, S2 cannot be 
implemented otherwise. Figure 30 shows the total costs of S1 and S2 when the extra costs 
of installing smart meters in all households are allocated to S2 (only). For S2, a theoretical 
rate of 100% of installed smart meter for electricity and gas is considered, and the costs have 
been calculated accordingly. For S1, only the costs of the extra percentage of smart meter 
installed have been taken into account. As can be seen, an installation rate of around 50% 
marks the limit where S2 becomes more interesting on the basis of the total costs of the 
systems. 
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Figure 30: Costs of S1 and S2 taking into account a partial deployment of Smart Meters 
 
2.6. Position Paper 
As the INESPO project is exploring the possibility to design new instruments to motivate 
households for energy savings, the smart meter roll-out is becoming a subject of burning 
actuality. Indeed, the deadline of 3 September 2012 when Member States have to deliver 
their cost-benefits analysis on smart meter roll-out is coming closer. Discussions regarding 
technological, legal and cost-bearing aspects of the roll-out (as well as how and when to do 
it) mobilize different stakeholders and points of views. But INESPO is focusing on another 
aspect which is under researched: how could a SM roll-out also be used to motivate 
households for energy savings? It was strongly felt during follow-up committee meetings that 
INESPO brings new arguments to the debate about SM roll-out that should be known to 
decision-makers in this field. It was therefore decided to produce a Position Paper (new Task 
5.0 added to the initial planning). This Position Paper, which is presented in the next section, 
is dedicated to policy-makers and stakeholders involved in the discussions around the smart 
meter roll-out. It was presented during an extended follow-up committee meeting of the 
INESPO project. 
 
Adding motivation to smart metering technology: the Innovative Instruments for 
Energy Saving Policies project 
On June 14th, the European Parliament and the Council have reached a compromise on a 
proposal for a Directive on Energy Efficiency that would repeal Directives 2004/8/EC and 
2006/32/EC. This text shows that the issues of informing and empowering consumers 
regarding their energy use has come up the policy agenda: 
“Member States shall take appropriate measures to promote and facilitate an 
efficient use of energy by small energy customers, including domestic customers. 
These measures may be part of a national strategy. (…) (T)hese measures shall 
include one or more of the elements listed below:  
(a) a range of instruments and policies to promote behavioural change” (Art. 8a) 
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The question of motivating households for energy savings is at the heart of the Innovative 
Instruments for Energy Saving Policies (INESPO) research project funded by Belgian 
Science Policy that started in 2010. This project is willing to give more attention to users of 
SM, especially to their behaviours and motivation for energy savings, an aspect that is 
insufficiently tackled when the focus in primarily on technological, legal and cost-bearing 
aspects of the SM roll-out.  
Indeed, energy savings is one of the few positive consequences that a user might expect 
from the replacement of his old analogue meter by a SM. But, as research confirms, it is far 
from obvious that placing a SM will lead to any saving at all, if users are not motivated. The 
INESPO project is precisely aiming at coming up with innovative ideas to motivate users for 
energy savings, should a significant roll-out occur.  
The research carried out in the INESPO project focuses on the innovative concept of 
coupling non-financial incentives to smart meters in order to increase motivation for 
behavioural changes towards energy savings. At the core of the project is the design of 
system architectures that integrate non-financial incentives and smart meters, as well as 
the technical feasibility and social acceptability of the designed systems. 
This Position Paper results from the research carried out in the INESPO project and 
summarizes the starting points, as well as the recommendations that stems from it.  
2.6.1. Context 
Smart Meters roll-out: a rapidly evolving context in the EU 
Back in 2006, the Energy Service Directive (2006/32/CE) stated that “(b)illing on the basis of 
actual consumption shall be performed frequently enough to enable customers to regulate 
their own energy consumption”. At that time, the expectations for energy savings that users 
could make due to smart meters were rather optimistic. In case of direct feedback to the 
users, those savings were even estimated around 5-15% (Darby, 2006). A few years later, it 
was requested by the 3rd Energy Package (Directive 2009/72/CE) that Member States make 
a cost-benefit analysis for the deployment of smart meters, with the obligation of a 80% roll-
out in case of a positive result. 
But the context around smart meters is rapidly evolving in the EU. Cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) performed by Member States are not all positive (e.g. PWC, 2012 for Brussels 
Region, which makes Belgium‟s final position unclear). Besides, consumer opposition to 
smart meters has also risen in some countries (e.g. The Netherlands).  
Billing, direct feed-back and motivation 
The context has also evolved around what could be expected from the smart meter 
technology in terms of energy savings for households.  
If the added-value of the smart meter for the customer is limited to obtaining frequent enough 
billing on the basis of actual consumption, there is not much in recent studies to be optimistic 
on the energy savings potential for households. A next step is then to provide direct feed-
back to customers via an in-house display. However, even in the case of direct feed-back, 
recent studies show modest energy-saving potential (see EDRP, 2011 in Klopfert and 
Wallenborn, 2011) and even sometimes forms of lock-in once some energy savings have 
been achieved (Hargreaves et al., 2010).  
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The INESPO project builds on the conviction that users‟ motivation deserves more attention 
than is currently bestowed to it. Indeed, recent studies show growing evidence that a SM 
deployment without informing and motivating users has but little potential for behavioural 
changes. Through the systems designed in the INESPO project, public authorities could find 
a proper channel to add information and motivation to the smart meter technology. In this 
sense, if and when a SM roll-out occurs, it should be seen by public authorities also as an 
opportunity not to be missed to care for information and motivation of users. 
2.6.2. The INESPO project 
At the time the INESPO project was conceived, the discussions around smart meters were 
essentially technology-driven and there were important forces at play for a massive 
deployment of smart meters in the EU. Focusing more on the human beings behind the 
smart meter technology was a first objective of the INESPO project. Besides, as the literature 
review showed that the link between smart meters and energy savings for households was 
not undisputable, it became more and more obvious that there was a gap on the issue of 
motivating households for energy savings in the researches carried out around smart meters. 
The INESPO project is seeking innovative instruments to fill in this gap by adding incentives 
to the smart meter technology.  
The INESPO project has led to the design of three instruments to motivate households for 
energy savings. The designed systems are based on the innovative idea of coupling a non-
financial incentive (complementary currencies) to smart meters. A variant with a market 
based financial incentive (white certificates) has also been explored.  
Those instruments can adapt to different types of roll-outs but require some common 
standards regarding connectivity and modularity of smart meters. The objective of this 
Position Paper is to inform policy-makers about the new instruments designed in the 
INESPO project and the technical requirements developing this type of instruments involves. 
It is important that the new elements brought by the INESPO project are taken into account 
before decisions are made for the roll-out of smart meters. Indeed, those technical 
requirements have to be taken into account before the roll-out takes place and, since 
technology choices once deployed are not easily bent, this is an opportunity not to be 
missed.  
INESPO in a nutshell 
The INESPO project is seeking to design new instruments to motivate households in order to 
achieve significant energy savings 
The new instruments are based on the innovative idea of coupling a non-financial incentive 
(complementary currencies) to smart meter. A variant with a market-based financial incentive 
(white certificates) has also been investigated. 
Three system designs were developed that can adapt to different roll-out schemes 
Minimum technical requirements should be defined before roll-out to avoid missing the 
opportunity 
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2.6.3. Starting Point of the Position Paper 
Smart meters roll-out 
The context around smart meters has evolved in Belgium. Questions have arisen on whether 
or not a roll-out will take place in Belgium, and on the form it should eventually take. 
Answering those questions is beyond the scope of the INESPO study. However, the starting 
point of this position paper is that a smart meter roll-out is likely to occur anyway. Indeed, in 
case of negative cost-benefit analysis (Belgium would then not be bound to equip 80% of 
consumers with smart meters), the roll-out of SM could then be driven by other forces, such 
as a pull-effect due to smart-grid management, or should a legal obligation for monthly billing 
on basis of actual consumption be decided, or via a push from the SM industry for instance. 
According to the analysis of the forces at play, it seems thus likely that, whether through the 
Directive or else, the SM technology will enter households in a medium term. A major 
difference is that: 
- in case of a positive CBA, the Directive states that “at least 80% of consumers should 
be equipped with intelligent metering systems by 2020.”  
- in case of a negative cost-benefit analysis, there is no clear view on the timing and 
mode of roll-out. 
Irrespective of the way a potential roll-out takes place, there are still key questions to be 
answered including the question of what will be foreseen as feed-back system, for instance.  
Defining functionalities of smart meters 
Functionalities of smart meters must be defined taking into account multiple interests. As 
developed in Klopfert and Wallenborn (2011, p. 11 and 12), mostly feed-back and energy 
services are important for household energy savings, whereas from the smart grid point of 
view, data collection and remote control of some appliances are key. From the third point of 
view, which is represented by „the market‟ in Figure 31, the main interests are towards 
reducing fraud and unpaid invoices as well as eventually using load profiles to propose new 
tariff schemes. 
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Figure 31: Three different view of a smart meter 
How those interests can converge is a complex issue, but as the authors argue, this issue is 
currently mostly left “in the hands of the techno-economical actors, with an 
underrepresentation of consumers and of “energy savings” as a main objective” (Klopfert and 
Wallenborn, 2011, p. 12).  
Energy saving potential of smart meters 
Studies have aimed at defining the energy saving potential of smart meter technology for 
households. A first prerequisite is to draw a clear line between the effects for households of 
just replacing an old analogic meter by a smart meter which enables more regular billing on 
the basis of actual consumption, and the effects of adding devices and services to smart 
meters, such as in house displays for feed-back or tips for lowering energy consumption. 
This difference is reflected in studies under the form of indirect and direct feed-back. Figures 
between 0-10% were usually given for indirect feedback and 5-15% for direct feed-back (see, 
for instance, Darby, 2006).  
However in recent studies the potential is more limited and seems to reach a ceiling of 4%, 
even when accurate billing plus in house display plus energy efficiency advices are used 
(see EDRP, 2011 for instance in Klopfert and Wallenborn, 2011). In the study carried out for 
Brussels Environment by PWC (2012), figures around 1.5% energy savings for households 
are considered. Klopfert and Wallenborn (2011) set forth several reasons to explain why 
results may vary regarding the energy saving potential of smart meters. Those include the 
important role of motivation (selection of samples, Hawthorne effect, etc.). Most interestingly, 
in the only study where households were not informed about the experiment going on, the 
replacement of the old meter by a smart meter did not impact their consumption (EDRP, 
2011). Motivation, as well as capability seems thus to play a key role in empowering 
households to make energy savings 
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Adding non-financial incentives (complementary currencies) to smart meters 
To increase household motivation, innovative policy instruments are designed in the INESPO 
project by adding non-financial incentives (complementary currencies) to smart meters. This 
is building on the emerging trend to use complementary currencies as policy instruments for 
sustainability (see, for instance projects such as E-portemonnee, Torekes or the former NU-
Spaarpas project). Considering the fact that those projects have not been designed for 
research (for instance, there is no zero time evaluation, neither control groups) it is difficult to 
draw scientific evidence on their impact on behaviours at this point. If one turns to research 
on commercial loyalty schemes, which have some common features with the considered CC 
schemes regarding the system used, there are mixed reports in the literature regarding their 
effectiveness on consumer loyalty (see, for instance, Reinartz and Kumar, 2002; Noordhoff 
et al., 2004; Demoulin and Zidda, 2008; Smith and Sparks, 2009). Further researches are 
thus necessary to address this question. However, thousands of companies around the world 
are carrying on with loyalty schemes that reward millions of customers. It can thus be argued 
that there are at least some success indicators for this kind of systems. 
Although there is still room for research regarding the impact of complementary currencies 
on behaviours, the nature of those instruments provide indications on the added-value they 
can bring. 
Indeed, if designed properly, complementary currencies should have the potential to: 
- Sustain behavioural change over time thanks to the potential of complementary 
currencies systems to repetitively remind and motivate participants over time 
- Reduce the rebound effect by choosing adequately the using of the complementary 
currencies obtained 
- Be cost-effective compared to direct subsidies for instance due to the fact that each 
Euro invested in the scheme can serve to promote at least two sustainable 
behaviours (obtaining and using). Besides, a leakage effect (i.e. participants not using 
some CC units they have earned) is commonly observed in complementary currency 
schemes. 
More specifically regarding the coupling of complementary currencies and smart meters 
- The systems integrating complementary currencies and smart meters that are 
designed in the INESPO project are adapted to different roll-out schemes (for 
instance, systems based on rewarding could be more interesting if a niche of 
households with about average consumption is targeted). 
- The systems designed in the INESPO project are (apart from the one with a marked-
based system of white certificates) isolated from the financial systems. 
- The taxonomy developed in the INESPO project shows that there are many 
parameters on which public authorities can play so that the resulting instruments 
reflect their choices in terms of energy policy for the household sector. 
Technical requirements 
Systems including feedback and incentives such as the ones developed in the INESPO 
research project involve some technical requirements. Indeed, high quality measurements 
are necessary for such system to deliver reliable information to the households. Various and 
evolving feedback devices should be foreseen in order to take advantage of the future 
development in this domain. Besides, potentially high data rates are necessary. 
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Since the future is unknown (including its technological and behavioural dimensions), it is 
necessary to avoid situation of potential lock-in by caring for the access to data of 
consumers. Modularity as well as open standards should be preferred, in order for the future 
developments to be integrated. Besides, as emerging energy services provide added-value 
to households, their development should be eased by technological choices made for the 
smart meter infrastructure. 
2.6.4. Recommendations 
Smart Meter roll-out should include: 
- Free accessible communication port for in-house use 
- Consumption data that can be managed by the consumer independently of the SM-
DSO connection 
- Optional feed-back systems (displays, websites, etc.) 
- Optional transfer of data to chosen third-party (ESCos, energy services such as the 
ones that could be built around the INESPO concept, etc.) 
Minimum requirements for in-house connectivity should be defined prior to the roll-
out 
This includes the question of who can define connectivity standards 
At least the following elements have to be taken into consideration: 
- Stakeholders 
- Legal constraints 
- Owner of the connection 
- Selection of standards  
- Physical aspects (cable, connector, protocol, etc.) 
Trials should be performed to validate the new CC-SM instrument 
CC architecture should be defined according to the selected deployment scheme 
This includes the question of the governance of a CC architecture 
At least the following elements have to be taken into consideration 
- Developing of an appropriate scheme 
- Interest of stakeholders 
- Privacy / Legal 
- Rewarding vs. Regulatory 
2.7. Further policy recommendations and conclusions 
The INESPO project is pioneering the innovative idea of using the smart meter infrastructure 
to motivate households for energy savings through the adding of an incentive scheme. This 
incentive scheme is based on complementary currencies, with a variant of “white certificates 
for households. In this early stage of research the INESPO project is exploring possible 
system designs for the coupling of complementary currencies and smart meters.  
Considering the exploratory nature of the research carried out in the INESPO project, further 
research are absolutely necessary before policy instruments can be built from the designs 
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developed in the project. Amongst others, the legal and privacy aspects should be 
investigated, which have not been covered in the INESPO project: 
Besides, further studies on the aspects linked to stakeholders, governance and social 
acceptability are equally necessary.  
Bearing those limitations in mind, the INESPO project has nevertheless contributed to filling 
a gap in the researches carried out on smart meters regarding the issue of motivating 
households for energy savings. Indeed, at the core of the INESPO project is the design 
(including the technical aspects) of system architectures that integrate complementary 
currencies or “white certificates for households” and smart meters. The research carried out 
in the project results in two system designs that lay the foundation for using complementary 
currencies as a non-financial incentive for energy savings in the household sector (with a 
marked-based variant). Those systems are intended to be used and financed by public 
authorities.  
2.7.1. System designs 
A major step stone in the design of the systems is the taxonomy of constitutive parameters 
which is developed in the project. This taxonomy allows reducing the complexity of the 
systems and is the key element on which the systems are designed and later evaluated.  
The work carried out in the taxonomy sheds light on the importance of the choice of the 
model in the design phase. Indeed, the research on the possible rationale for the models 
shows a polarity between a rewarding and a regulatory architecture. This polarity is used as 
a fundamental distinction between the two systems designed in the INESPO project. 
System design 1 (S1) based on a rewarding architecture 
In S1, households participate to the system on a voluntary basis and are “rewarded” by 
public authorities for their energy savings. This occurs in two major ways: 
- Households can obtain CC units through their relative consumption reduction over 
a given period of time (Δ in consumption) 
- Households can obtain CC units for some specific actions related to increasing a 
dwellings‟ energy performance, buying basic energy efficient appliances / products, 
energy audit, maintenance, as well as energy education.  
How households can be using their CC units is a key parameter to bring participants on 
board in a rewarding system. Therefore, on top of using their CC units for further investments 
in all the actions that allows them to obtain CC units, extra possibilities have been foreseen 
to make the system more attractive. Those possibilities to be explored comprise paying 
green electricity bills or converting into CC units from other existing systems that have 
compatible objectives (provided agreements are concluded with suppliers / governance of 
other CC systems).  
System design 2 (S2) based on a regulatory architecture 
Using a regulatory model is an option which has not been implemented yet but has been 
proposed for other CC systems. This type of model is radically different as it based on 
mandatory participation and the willingness to comply with regulations put in place by public 
authorities. Such a regulatory system allows working on the total energy consumption and 
setting targets for household energy consumption.  
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In the architecture of S2, the system is based on a model with mandatory participation of 
every household. S2 is based on energy targets which are calculated for households taking 
some elements of their profile into account. Each household obtains a number of CC units 
that corresponds to its energy targets.  
As a household consumes energy, it also uses CC units accordingly. At the end of the period 
for which the target was set, a given household energy consumption can  
- meet their energy target: all CC units have been used 
- be more than their energy target: they are is a shortage of CC units 
- be less than their energy target: they have remaining CC units 
The price paid for energy itself remains unaffected in the INESPO S2 system and since the 
target is given in CC units, it does not physically limit the energy consumption as a quota 
would do. However, the fact that households earn or pay some extra Euros for CC units 
according to their consumption has a global effect on their budget for energy consumption. 
Technical aspects 
Regarding technical options for the smart meters, two options were considered:  
- a base scenario where neither the metering infrastructure nor the meter itself can be 
accessed directly by the INESPO system. It provides remote reading of the 
measurement indexes without any further processing. 
- an advanced scenario where smart meters can be extended to incorporate INESPO 
specific functions. It foresees in-home displays, recharging/redeeming at home, 
driven by an extendable smart meter platform. 
The research carried out on the use cases mainly comprises consumer as well as back-office 
use cases. First insights for the underlying database are derived from those use-cases. 
Besides, architecture outlines are also developed for the base and the advanced scenarios.  
Possible bottlenecks 
If a central back-office is used in the INESPO system, the following bottlenecks would require 
special attention: 
- Computation of CCs 
- User statistics 
- Transaction management (buying/selling) 
The front-end can play a major role in the offloading of the back-office because it is in an 
ideal position to act as both a caching and load-balancing system. More on this subject is 
found in the next section on scalability considerations. 
Scalability considerations 
Because the INESPO architecture potentially has to serve millions of users, scalability is a 
major concern. But just as in any other high availability business application, two methods 
can be used to increase the service capacity: scaling up (adding more resources to a 
system, such as more memory, disks or CPUs) and scaling out (adding more computer 
systems). 
Furthermore, several general design considerations can be taken into account when a more 
concrete implementation is built, such as splitting, service-oriented architecture or functional 
partitioning, or asynchronous handling of requests). 
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Social acceptability 
The focus groups provide insights on the social acceptability of the designed systems (S1 
and S2). As could be expected, the rewarding system (S1) is preferred to the regulatory 
system (S2). Besides, participants in general are very favourable to the idea of using 
complementary currencies as non-financial incentives. The concern about the system being 
unfair to the households which have made the most effort to reduce their energy 
consumption which is inherent to the S1 system is spotted by the participants, as well as the 
owner / renter issue.  
Regarding the system design S2, as could be expected, it is only favoured by a minority of 
participants. However, it is generally conceived as a potentially very effective system to 
reduce households‟ energy consumption. In fact, when asked about the readiness of people 
to adopt this kind of systems, concerns raise especially for the short and the medium term. It 
is considered that, if announced in time and backed by sufficient transitional measures, the 
core of the system is generally valuable in the long run. Complementary concerns rejoin 
those described in the system designed, such as complexity or fairness of this system, and 
the possibility to escape the system by switching to other type of energy sources (wood 
pellets, coal, etc.). 
2.7.2. Further policy recommendations 
The research carried out regarding the technical aspects and the social acceptability of the 
designed systems (S1 and S2) does not seem to raise any insurmountable issue. Those 
systems seem thus to be workable. However, it is important to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of those systems which are inherent to their design. 
Strengths - weaknesses and recommendations– S1 
Strengths:  
- S1 has the potential to promote energy savings among those who are consuming the 
most, and have made little to no effort yet to reduce their consumption. Indeed, it will 
be easiest for them to make the necessary investments and be rewarded by the 
system. 
- S1 is more attractive (rewarding) and socially acceptable (voluntary participation). 
- In its mechanism, S1 is close to a subsidy, although in CC. 
- Through the obtaining-earning and using lists, S1 allows for public authorities to focus 
on specific aspects of their energy saving policies. 
Weaknesses: 
- This system over-rewards households which are consuming the most and have made 
no efforts yet to reduce their consumption. On the contrary, households which have 
already made all necessary investments and efforts to change their behaviours are 
penalised. Indeed, it is more difficult for those who have already made the necessary 
investments to continue reducing their energy consumption. In this sense, this system 
can be seen as over-rewarding those who have made the least efforts yet and 
penalising those who have made the most efforts towards reducing their energy 
consumption. 
- Because S1 is based on a voluntary participation, its impact is reduced in comparison 
to a regulatory system. 
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- This system needs public subsidies to function. It is not self-sustaining, and is costly 
to public authorities 
- This system has a tendency to “kill itself over time”. Indeed, as households perform 
the actions that the system promotes, they have less and less opportunity to earn CC 
units over time. 
Recommendations S1 
The attractivity of the using list is the key mechanism to bring households on board the S1 
system. It is thus recommended to enlarge the using list compared to the obtaining-earning 
list by including some extra items. However, special attention must be given to the 
consistency of the system which should be kept in line with its energy saving objectives. It is 
thus necessary to make a sort of trade-off between attractivity and consistency. The 
proposed ideas to be explored for enlarging the using list of S1 are the following: paying 
green electricity bills or converting into CC units from other existing systems with compatible 
objectives (provided proper agreements and infrastructure are put in place). 
Regarding the “over-rewarding” of households which have made the least efforts yet, it was 
purposely decided to use the polarity rewarding – regulatory to design the systems. This 
implies that the logic of S1 was pushed to its extreme without trying to fix its weaknesses, as 
was also done for S2. However, if a policy instrument inspired by S1 was to be developed, 
two options seem possible: 
- Selecting as the target of the system the households with high energy consumption 
which have done the least efforts yet. This could be based on the rationale of using 
such a (costly) rewarding system to promote energy savings in the segment of 
households with the most energy saving potential. 
- Introducing some mechanisms of profile computation and capping for the initial 
energy consumption on which the Δ in consumption is calculated. 
Strengths, weaknesses and recommendations - S2 
Strengths 
- Every household has to participate to the system 
- Targets can be set for energy consumption (energy policy) 
- Financial sustainability of the system (once installed) if targets are properly set  
- Depending on the choices made for the parameters of the calculation of energy 
targets, the rationale of the system can be relatively easy to understand (“everyone 
gets an energy target”) 
Weaknesses 
- Households that are high above the energy targets when the system is put in place 
will have major problems to comply 
- The S2 architecture is vulnerable to an excess of CC units (too much CC units 
allotted = energy targets set too generously). Special attention should be given to 
establishing the energy targets in this respect. 
- S2 is close to a tax system/ progressive tariff for those exceeding their energy 
targets, and is most likely to be perceived in a negative way.  
- A key parameters for social acceptability is the way the energy targets are calculated 
and the perceived fairness of the system. The penalty applied is also important. 
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- Households might need an adaptation period in order to understand the functioning of 
the system (how to buy/exchange CC units, etc.)  
Recommendations S2 
A central issue in the S2 system is its social acceptability and fairness. Setting the targets 
properly is key in this respect. Targets which are too difficult to reach are, of course, not 
acceptable. But the system is also very vulnerable to an excess of CC units (too much CC 
units allotted = energy targets too easy to reach). Besides, from the households point of 
view, the parameters taken into account to calculate their target and allotted number of CC 
units is key for their perception of the fairness of the system and, in turn, its social 
acceptability. At this stage of research, it is not yet possible to give more precise 
recommendations specially bearing in mind the fact that those decisions are inevitably 
involving multiple stakeholders and governance structure. 
Regarding the complexity of the system, it does not seem to be an insurmountable obstacle, 
as was stated in the focus groups, provided proper communication and support is provided. 
Comparisons with other options to reach the same energy savings objectives should be done 
to recommend, or not, the development of a policy instrument inspired by S2.  
The issue of households that are high above energy targets is inherent to the system design 
of S2 and, as for S1; it was decided to bring the system to its limit by not trying to fix it. 
However, a variant of S2 is built with market-based “white certificates for households”. In this 
variant, on top of the rationale for obtaining and using CC units that operate in S2, 
households have the possibility to trade their CC units in an eBay-like virtual market. 
According to mainstream economic theories, this could be an efficient way of reaching 
energy saving targets. It might be less expensive for households which are high above 
targets and could also motivate some households to outperform their targets in order to 
benefit from the (limited) stream of revenue obtained by selling the extra CC units when 
consuming less than the target. However, this leads to a lower autonomy of the S2 system 
as it becomes coupled to a market in euro subjected to fluctuations. Public authorities also 
lose control to some extent on the target / penalty equilibrium of the system. If the prices on 
the market are lower than the penalty, this could weaken the motivation of households that 
are high above target to take the appropriate measures for energy savings. Besides, this 
could make the system less sustainable on a financial basis for public authorities, and 
especially vulnerable to an excess of CC units (too much CC units allotted = energy targets 
too easy to reach). 
General recommendation 
The tenant / owner issue is relevant for both S1 and S2. At this stage of the research, it is 
recommended to use the EPB certificate as a corrective factor. However, further research is 
needed concerning mechanisms to promote investments of owners in rented housing. 
It can also be argued that S1 could be used for free-riding by households which planned to 
do the investments anyway. This could be tempered with the using list of S1, if the CC units 
obtained by participating households can only be used for further investments in energy 
efficiency. However, as explained previously, the system has to be attractive enough for 
households to get on board. Special attention should however be given to the using list in 
order to limit free-riding. 
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Regarding S2, it can be argued that targets set for households could lead to a risk of energy 
consumption shifts to other sectors (e.g. systematically showering at the sports club, etc.). 
Further research would have to investigate, however, to which extent such a consumption 
shift is conceivable and practicable for households, which proportion would be ready to 
change their practices accordingly and which influence it would have on consumption. 
Another potential risk of S2 is that households switch to other types of energy sources than 
electricity and gas to escape the system (e.g. wood pellets, coal, etc.). The only way to limit 
those shifts is to develop mechanisms to monitor those energy sources as well. 
Modelling S1 and S2 
A model is built for S1 and S2 with the aim of providing first qualitative insights regarding the 
potential energy and CO2 savings of the systems, as well as their economic evaluation. 
Figure 32 shows how the total energy savings and costs of S1 and S2 evolve in function of 
the rewarding rate (for S1) and the penalty rate (for S2). The modeling of S1 and S2 tends to 
show that S2 is a much more efficient system both regarding energy / CO2 savings and 
economic aspects. This is mostly to be explained by the much higher participation rate that is 
expected in S2 compared to S1. Besides, S2 seems to be promoting behavioural changes 
more which lead to lower costs for households to achieve energy savings. Finally, the 
penalty applied in S2 brings the system to an economic equilibrium. 
 
Figure 32: Costs and savings of S1 and S2 models 
However those modeling are based on the hypothesis of 80% smart meter deployment. 
Although for S1, this hypothesis is not critical, S2 cannot be implemented otherwise.  
Figure 33 shows the total costs of S1 and S2 when the extra costs of installing more than 
20% smart meters are taken into account. For S2, a theoretical rate of 100% of installed 
smart meter is considered, and the costs for installing the missing smart meters for electricity 
and gas have been calculated accordingly. For S1, only the costs of the extra percentage of 
smart meter installed have been taken into account. As can be seen, an installation rate of 
around 50% marks the limit where S2 becomes more interesting on the basis of the total 
costs of the systems. 
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Figure 33: Costs of S1 and S2 taking into account a partial deployment of Smart Meters 
The hybrid solution 
Bearing the strengths and weaknesses of S1 and S2, a third system design (S3) is proposed, 
based on a hybrid architecture. In this S3 system, some features of the rewarding model are 
integrated into the regulatory model. Targets are still set for households which receive a 
number of CC units accordingly, such as in S2. However, the households that are high above 
target have the possibility to obtain extra CC units by being rewarded for some specific 
actions (such as in the obtaining-earning list in S1). The same rationale is applied to how the 
CC units can be used. Indeed, the households with a consumption lower than their target 
have more ways to use their remaining CC units (cf. the using list in S1).  
In this hybrid system S3, every household still has to participate, but the integration of some 
features of S1 allows extra flexibility to the system. 
However, further research is necessary to understand the impact this would have on the 
energy and CO2 savings, as well as the economic aspects of such a hybrid system 
2.7.3. Conclusions 
The INESPO project has pioneered the way for using complementary currencies (with a 
market-based variant for « white certificates for households) as an incentive scheme coupled 
to the smart meter infrastructure. The designed instruments resemble existing ones. Indeed, 
S1 is close in essence to a subsidy and S2 to a progressive tariff. However, the specificities 
of using complementary currencies make them different in many respects such as the 
rebound effect, the social network aspect or de-coupling.  
Many aspects of the designed instruments deserve further research, and trials should be 
made in households to investigate their impact on behaviours. 
However, as exposed in the Position Paper, the possibility to effectively develop those 
instruments leads to practical recommendations regarding the roll-out of smart meters. 
Although there is no clear vision yet on if, how and when the roll-out takes place, the 
implementation of such instruments require: 
- invoicing quality measurements 
- various and evolving feedback devices and services 
- potentially high data rates  
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This can be achieved via an access to MDM system, but preferably via a direct connection to 
the smart meter. Besides, in order to avoid DSO lock-ins, special attention should be given to 
consumer‟s access to data.  
Most importantly, it implies defining prior to deploying smart meters the necessary standards 
and requirements for  
- free accessible communication port for in-house use 
- consumption data manageable by consumer independently of the SM-DSO 
connection 
- optional feed-back systems (displays, websites, etc.) 
- optional transfer of data to chosen third-party (ESCos, energy services such as 
INESPO, etc.) 
Indeed, if those choices are not made prior to the deployment of smart meters, it could 
hamper for decades the possibility of using the smart meter infrastructure to develop 
instruments designed to motivate households for energy savings.  
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3. DISSEMINATION AND VALORISATION 
3.1. Presentation of Research Papers 
International workshops and conferences 
H. Joachain, (presentation) “Innovating Complementary Currencies International Workshop”, 
organised by the University of East Anglia (CSERGE), London, UK, 20 September 2010. 
G. Deconinck, H. Joachain, F. Klopfert, L. Holzemer, Z. Qui, K. De Craemer, K. Bachus, M. 
Hudon, “An approach towards socially acceptable energy saving policies via monetary 
instruments on the smart meter infrastructure,” Proc. NGInfra 3rd Int. Conf. on Infrastructure 
Systems & Services - theme Next Generation Infrastructure System for Eco Cities, 
Shenzhen, P.R.China, 10-12 Nov. 2010, 7 pages. 
H. Joachain, (presentation) Learning workshop “Microfinance and Environment: Informal and 
Formal Financing of Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation”, organized jointly by the 
University of Oxford (Wolfson College and SIAS), ULB (CERMi) and Paris I-Sorbonne (IRD), 
Oxford, UK, 9 and 10 December 2010. 
H. Joachain and F. Klopfert, « Emerging trend of complementary currencies systems as 
policy instrument for environmental purposes: changes ahead? » First International 
Conference on Community and Complementary Currencies, University of Lyon, France, 
February 2011. 
H. Joachain, (presentation), Working workshop organised by the University of East Anglia 
(CSERGE), London, UK, March 2011. 
Z. Qiu, G. Deconinck, “Smart Meter‟s Feedback and the Potential for Energy Savings in 
Household Sector: A Survey”, IEEE Int. Conf. on Networking, Sensing, and Control (ICNSC-
2011), 10-12 Apr. 2011, Delft, The Netherlands. 
H. Joachain, F. Klopfert and K. Maréchal, “Energy saving policies for the household sector: 
can „smart money‟ make a difference?” 2nd International Conference on Sustainability 
Transitions, University of Lund, Sweden, June 2011. 
G. Deconinck, B. Delvaux, K. De Craemer, Z. Qiu, R. Belmans, “Smart meters from the 
angles of consumer protection and public service obligations,” Proc. 16th Int. Conf. on 
Intelligent System Applications to Power Systems (ISAP-2011), Hersonissos (Crete), 
Greece, 25-28 Sep. 2011, 6 pages. 
H. Joachain, F. Klopfert and and L. De Smet, “Rewarding or regulatory policies for energy 
savings? The difference between perceived and modelled efficiency in the case of an 
innovative instrument for the household sector”. Paper presented and accepted (poster) for 
Eceee Summer School on Energy Efficiency, [forthcoming, 2013]. 
Workshops and conferences in Belgium 
K. De Craemer, G. Deconinck, "Analysis of state-of-the-art smart metering communication 
standards," Proc. 5th Joint IEEE IAS, PELS & PES Benelux Chapter Young Researchers 
Symp. in Electrical Power Engineering (YRS-2010), Leuven, Belgium, 29-30 Mar. 2010, 6 
pages. 
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Bachus K., Instrumenten voor klimaatbeleid: een multilevelperspectief. Paper gepresenteerd 
op het Vlaams Wetenschappelijk Economisch Congres, 19 November 2010, Gent, België. 
De Smet L., Social acceptability of innovative instruments for energy saving. ISDO (Intern 
K.U.Leuven Seminarie Duurzame Ontwikkeling), 13 September 2011, Leuven, België. 
Bachus K., Subsidies en duurzame ontwikkeling. Studiedag „Duurzame ontwikkeling: een 
beleid in transitie‟, 19 December 2011, Brussel, België. 
3.2. Follow-up committees 
The organisation of follow-up committees allowed sharing insights, obtaining feed-back and 
disseminating results of the INESPO project to members from: 
- Public authorities (regulators, federal public services, institute for environment, 
Regional Energy Agency)  
- Energy-related actors (Producers-Suppliers, technical actors, commercial actors)  
- Civil society (Consumer‟s organisation, environmental non-profit organisation)  
- Complementary currencies specialists  
- Scientific experts  
Besides, important stakeholders in the roll-out of smart meters in Belgium were invited to an 
extended follow-up committee where the Position Paper was presented  
3.3. Final workshop and website 
The Final workshop was organised as an event of the EU Sustainable Energy Week 
(organised by the EU Commission). This allowed disseminating the results to a larger public, 
as well as gaining visibility as an event of this major event for sustainable energy in Europe. 
More information on the project is also available on the website www.inespo.be 
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4. PUBLICATIONS 
4.1. Proceedings form International Conferences 
G. Deconinck, H. Joachain, F. Klopfert, L. Holzemer, Z. Qui, K. De Craemer, K. Bachus, M. 
Hudon, “An approach towards socially acceptable energy saving policies via monetary 
instruments on the smart meter infrastructure,” Proc. NGInfra 3rd Int. Conf. on Infrastructure 
Systems & Services - theme Next Generation Infrastructure System for Eco Cities, 
Shenzhen, P.R.China, 10-12 Nov. 2010, 7 pages. 
Z. Qiu, G. Deconinck, “Smart Meter‟s Feedback and the Potential for Energy Savings in 
Household Sector: A Survey”, Proc. 2011 IEEE Int. Conf. on Networking, Sensing, and 
Control (ICNSC-2011), 10-12 Apr. 2011, Delft, The Netherlands, pp. 281-286. 
G. Deconinck, B. Delvaux, K. De Craemer, Z. Qiu, R. Belmans, “Smart meters from the 
angles of consumer protection and public service obligations,” Proc. 16th Int. Conf. on 
Intelligent System Applications to Power Systems (ISAP-2011), Hersonissos (Crete), 
Greece, 25-28 Sep. 2011, 6 pages. 
4.2. International Journals (Peer-reviewed) 
Joachain, H. and Klopfert, F. (2012) „Emerging trend of complementary currencies systems 
as policy instruments for environmental purposes: changes ahead?‟ International Journal of 
Community Currency Research 16 (D) 156-168 www.ijccr.net 
4.3. Further prospects 
H. Joachain and F. Klopfert, “Smart meters as an opportunity to motivate households for 
energy savings? Designing innovative policy instruments based on the coupling of smart 
meters and non-financial incentives”. Submitted to the European Society for Ecological 
Economics (ESEE) 2013 Conference, June, Lille. 
H. Joachain, F. Klopfert and L. De Smet, “Rewarding or regulatory policies for energy 
savings? The difference between perceived and modelled efficiency in the case of an 
innovative instrument for the household sector”. Paper presented and accepted (poster) for 
Eceee Summer School on Energy Efficiency, 2013. 
H. Joachain, F. Klopfert and K. Maréchal, “Energy saving policies for the household sector: 
can „smart money‟ make a difference?” this paper presented at the 2nd International 
Conference on Sustainability Transitions, University of Lund, Sweden, June 2011 is being 
finalized for submission to Energy Policy (International Journal with peer-review). 
H. Joachain and F. Klopfert. “Compteurs intelligents et monnaies complémentaires. INESPO, 
un outil innovant pour réduire la consommation énergétique des ménages”. This note for the 
Veblen Institute for Economic Reform is currently being finalised for publication.
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